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Abstract
Crew scheduling has traditionally been the last step in the process of service planning,
and it has traditionally aimed at minimizing manpower costs because it was assumed
that the crew schedule does not directly impact service quality. There has been a
growing recognition that crew schedules do in fact affect performance, especially dur-
ing disruptions, and in that context different crew schedules perform differently.
The primary objective of this research is to evaluate the robustness of a crew schedule,
or in other words, the performance of a crew schedule under a range of commonly
observed disrupted conditions. While the thesis focuses on the Piccadilly Line on
the London Underground, the concepts and methods developed are intended to be
applicable to a range of metro lines and systems.
The thesis has four components: first, a description of the types of incidents that take
place on a line, the type of service control interventions used to respond to incidents,
and the intimate relationship between the crew schedule and service control policies;
second, a comparative analysis of the structure of two Piccadilly Line crew schedules
to demonstrate how two crew schedules with similar underlying timetables can have
very different structures, and how those structural differences can affect performance;
third, the development of a simulation-based framework for evaluating the robustness
of crew schedules, and a simulation model of the Piccadilly Line; and finally, the
application of the simulation model to evaluate and compare the performance of the
same two Piccadilly Line crew schedules under a range of disrupted conditions.
Based on observation and understanding the relationship between the crew schedule
and service control, a service control module has been implemented in the simulation.
This module mimics the actions of a service controller when the operations plan is
disrupted and is a key contribution of this research. This allows for the simulation of
incidents on the line which leads to an understanding of how the structure of a crew
schedule affects its performance during disruptions. Elements of a crew schedule such
as slack time and relief locations are identified as key drivers of robustness. The effect
of these elements on performance is demonstrated by comparing the simulated per-
formance of two crew schedules that differ in the distribution of these elements.
The simulation also allows the testing of hypothetical crew schedules, such as those
corresponding to different labour agreements. Therefore, it can be used to test the
performance impact of changes in labour agreements. This is demonstrated for the
case of the Piccadilly Line through the simulation of two hypothetical scenarios where
two different labour constraints are relaxed.
The thesis concludes with recommendations to Piccadilly Line and London Under-
ground management and staff regarding crew scheduling, service control and data
collection. Results suggest that the slack time in Piccadilly Line crew schedules could
be redistributed in a way that improves performance by relaxing other constraints,
and that service controllers currently make control decisions without easy access to
critical crew information and control decisions could be improved by providing them
with better information on crew activities.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H.M. Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Thesis Supervisor: Harilaos N. Koutsopoulos
Title: Visiting Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
To my parents,
Srilatha Ravichandran & N. Ravichandran,
for their unconditional love and support.

Acknowledgments
I wish to wholeheartedly thank Professors Nigel Wilson and Haris Koutsopoulos for
their time and patience. They have been a constant source of support, and without
their knowledge, advice and dedication, this thesis would not have been possible. I
cannot thank them enough for all that they have done. Others at MIT, particu-
larly John Attanucci and Ginny Siggia, also played an important role in guiding my
research and helping this document come to fruition.
I am indebted to the staff at Transport for London for their generous help in support-
ing this research. I would like to thank, among others, Chris Taggart and Phil O'Hare
from the Piccadilly Line; Charles Horsey, Stuart Wilson, Mark Godfrey and Paul
Western from Scheduling Services; and Caroline Harper, Lauren Sager-Weinstein,
Madhuri Shah and Duncan Horne from TfL for all their help and feedback through-
out the process.
It is my friends and roommates that made life in Boston so much fun. I am eter-
nally thankful to Naveen Kartik, Rama Krishna Simhadri, Ajit Kamath and Vivek
Sivathanu for their companionship; and specially to Varun Pattabhiraman for shar-
ing so much of his life with me. I have to thank Aditi Balachandar and Vaishnavi
Surendra for making my stays in London so much fun. Finally, I would like to thank
all my friends at the Transit Lab for getting me through these two years.

Contents
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Background and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 The service delivery process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Why study robust crew scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4 Research objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Research approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Organization of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Background & Literature Review 23
2.1 Transport for London & the London Underground . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 The Piccadilly Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 The crew scheduling process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.1 The service planning process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 Crew scheduling constraints on the Piccadilly Line . . . . . . 31
2.4 Service control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.1 Disruptions and schedule deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.2 Service control interventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.3 The service control process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Service control and robust crew scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6.1 Sim ulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.6.2 Reliability and robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6.3 Service recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 Structural Evaluation of Piccadilly Line Crew Schedules 53
3.1 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 54
3.1.1 The crew schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1.2 The train and duty analysis (TDA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1.3 The crew roster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Comparing the structure of two crew schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.1 Relief directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2.2 Driving time: The 4h 15m parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2.3 M eal reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
9
3.2.4 Intermediate reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.5 End of Duty (EoD) reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.2.6 Duty length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4 Simulation-based Framework for Evaluating Crew Schedules 71
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 Framework for simulation-based evaluation of robustness . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Simulation architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.3.1 Simulation inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3.2 Simulation methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.3 Departure time function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.4 Arrival time function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.5 Service control . * . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 93
4.3.6 Simulation output: Performance evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Simulation model of the Piccadilly Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4.1 Route structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4.2 Running time models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4.3 Dwell time models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4.4 Station details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4.5 Service control in the Piccadilly Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Simulation-based evaluation of Piccadilly Line crew schedules 111
5.1 Model validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.1.1 Undisrupted conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.1.2 Disrupted conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2 Comparative evaluation of Piccadilly Line schedules 48 and 49 . . . . 119
5.2.1 Distribution of incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.2.2 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2.3 Simulating hypothetical scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Conclusion 133
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 133
6.2 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.2.1 Crew scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.2.2 Service control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2.3 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.3 Limitations of this work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.4 Directions for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
10
List of Figures
1-1 Transit service delivery as a business process [2]. . . . . . . . . . .
2-1 London's public transport network. [17] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2-2 Change in number of trips since 1993, by mode. [18] . . . . . . . .
2-3 The geometry and service pattern of the Piccadilly Line . . . . . .
2-4 Peak thirty minute (AM) flow on the Piccadilly Line - Eastbound
2-5 Peak thirty minute (AM) flow on the Piccadilly Line - Westbound
2-6 Example of a renumbering operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3-1 A sample duty from the Acton Town weekday crew schedule . . .
3-2
3-3
3-4
3-5
3-6
3-7
3-8
3-9
3-10
3-11
3-12
3-13
3-14
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-7
4-8
4-9
4-10
4-11
4-12
[15]
[15]
An example of a single-spell duty . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An example of a typical two-spell, two run duty. . . . . .
An example of a night duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Some of the cover duties scheduled at Acton Town . . . .
A sample TDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An excerpt from the Acton Town roster . . . . . . . . . .
Distribution of driving time in the two crew schedules . .
Meal break slack vs Lateness at ACT-EB . . . . . . . . .
Meal break slack vs Lateness at ACT-WB . . . . . . . .
Meal break slack vs Lateness at AGR-EB . . . . . . . . .
Meal break slack vs Lateness at AGR-WB . . . . . . . .
EoD Late running margin vs. Time to hit a parameter .
Cumulative distribution of duty lengths . . . . . . . . . .
Framework for simulation-based evaluation of robustness
Simulation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Processing a Projected Arrival event . . . . . . . . . . .
Processing an Actual Arrival event . . . . . . . . . . . .
Processing a Projected Departure event . . . . . . . . . .
Processing an Actual Departure event . . . . . . . . . . .
Scatter plot of running times of successive trains (ACT-AGR) . . . .
Scatter plot of running time deviations of successive trains (ACT-AGR)
Waterfall diagram showing train movement around an incident . . . .
Reduced route structure of the Piccadilly Line used in the simulation
Histogram of running times from Acton Town to Arnos Grove . . . .
Actual and scheduled running time (ACT-AGR) by time of day . . .
11
17
24
25
26
28
29
44
54
55
56
56
56
. . . . . . . 58
. . . . . . . 59
. . . . . . . 61
. . . . . . . 63
. . . . . . . 63
. . . . . . . 64
. . . . . . . 64
. . . . . . . 67
. . . . . . . 68
. . . . . . . 75
. . . . . . . 78
. . . . . . . 80
. . . . . . . 82
. . . . . . . 84
. . . . . . . 85
89
89
92
95
97
98
4-13 Scatter plot of dwell times at Acton Town eastbound . . . . . . . . . 100
4-14 Histogram of dwell times at Acton Town eastbound . . . . . . . . . . 101
4-15 Service control strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5-1 Running times of successive trains between ACT and AGR (Schedule
48, undisrupted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5-2 Average lateness of trains arriving at crew change locations (Schedule
48, undisrupted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5-3 Average headway between trains departing AGR-EB (Schedule 48,
undisrupted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5-4 Average lateness with and without service control for Scenario 1 . . . 117
5-5 Average lateness for Scenario 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5-6 Slack versus Lateness at ACT-EB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5-7 Slack versus Lateness at ACT-WB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5-8 Spatial distribution of Missed pickups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5-9 Temporal distribution of Missed pickups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
12
List of Tables
Overall statistics for the two crew schedules . . . . . . .
Comparison of Relief Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparison of Meal break Slack time . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparison of intermediate reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comparison of EoD reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Performance measures for Scenario 1 . .. . . . .. .. .
Distribution of incident duration by period (in minutes)
Spatial distribution of incidents on the Piccadilly Line.
Performance measures for schedules 48 and 49 . . . . . .
Meal break slack across missed pickups . . . . . . . . . .
EoD slack across early reliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Performance measures for schedule 49 with meal break
straint relaxed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . 58
. . . . . . . 60
. . . . . . . 62
. . . . . . . 65
. . . . . . . 66
. . . . . . . 116
. . . . . . . 121
. . . . . . . 122
. . . . . . . 123
. . . . . . . 127
127
length con-
. . . 128
5.8 Performance measures for schedule 49 with reduced walking time at
A rnos G rove . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
129
14
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents research on the evaluation of the robustness of the crew sched-
ule for rail transit service. It highlights the importance of the structure of the crew
schedule in improving robustness and making operations more resilient to disruptions.
Two different approaches to measuring this robustness -structural and simulation -
are discussed. A simulation based model is developed and validated for the Piccadilly
Line, and is used to perform a comparative evaluation of the robustness of two dif-
ferent crew schedules.
This research discusses ways in which a crew schedule can be made more robust. The
simulation model that is developed here can be used by schedulers and management
to predict the impact of changes in the crew schedule on robustness, caused either by
self-directed changes, or changes in labour agreements or service patterns. This will
also enable the identification of best practices for robust crew scheduling.
The main contribution of this research is the development of the simulation model to
evaluate robustness. The model simulates the line's operations under a spectrum of
real operating conditions with varying degrees of disruption. Simulating operations
during and after a disruption requires that real-time service control also be modelled,
and this has been done for the Piccadilly Line. While this kind of approach has been
taken in airline systems, it is novel in rail systems.
1.1 Background and motivation
The passenger experience on a high frequency metro is principally determined by short
and regular headways, which is not necessarily the same as running to timetable.
However, the timetable is still important for operations because late train arrivals
can mean that train operators are late for their meal breaks which can lead to missed
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connections, or are late in finishing their duties which can lead to overtime costs.
Secondly, the timetable is an operations plan that is understood by all the parties
involved (including service controllers, crew managers, station managers etc.) and
deviations from the plan, such as result from real-time control interventions, need to
be effectively communicated to all parties. Doing this in real-time requires advanced
information systems that continuously and accurately report the state of the system,
including real-time changes being made to the system in response to disruptions, and
new actions that are needed as a consequence of those changes. Large amounts of
capital are required to upgrade old communication systems and to provide such ad-
vanced capabilities. In the absence of such systems, disruptions cannot be handled
entirely in real-time by service control - there is a need to plan for them.
Traditionally, delays are absorbed in the timetable by a combination of recovery time
at the terminus at the end of a trip and padded running times. These strategies
do not work for a high-frequency metro service because providing recovery times re-
quires extra platform capacity at the termini, and padded running times can result
in blocking back of trains. Late running trains are often renumbered and "put back
on time" at the time of a crew change, or they may be short-tripped or cancelled,
or some combination of the above, which can have adverse effects on the customer
experience. The primary motivation for doing so is to bring drivers back to their crew
bases in time for their meal break, or next train, or the end of their duty. This may
be better achieved through the combination of a robust crew schedule and intelligent
service control.
The robustness of a schedule is often characterized by two mutually dependent prop-
erties: stability, or the ability to absorb small disruptions and still remain feasible,
and flexibility, or the ability to recover quickly from large disruptions. A crew sched-
ule is made robust by the presence of slack or buffer times, providing spare operators,
placing crew changes in locations and at times that maximize flexibility, and other
such methods.
Clearly, the price of robustness is increased crew costs, and to make a sensible trade-
off it is necessary to evaluate the utility of that robustness. Robustness can also be
improved by deploying manpower more effectively: deploying slack time and spare
operators where they are needed, providing the correct mix of relief locations, direc-
tions and times etc. Therefore, it is necessary to identify best practices for robust
crew scheduling. One way of doing this is to perform a comparative evaluation of
different crew schedules that systematically vary the above characteristics.
It is not possible to evaluate the robustness of a crew schedule without an under-
standing of service control because it is the service controllers who make use of the
flexibility offered by a crew schedule to effect real time interventions. Therefore, it
is necessary to evaluate the robustness of a crew schedule in the context of service
16
control strategies.
1.2 The service delivery process
One can imagine a transit service as a business process, as shown in Figure 1-1. The
overall service policies such as span of service, frequency and routing are determined
at the management levels of the transit agency. Service policies are usually based
on expected or actual demand, network connectivity considerations, financial con-
straints and political considerations. These policies are then used by the planning
department, which is responsible for developing an operations plan.
I ______I _ ____ IUaanlyi -evc
Service policy Timetable Operations passengers
--- -------------------------- 
--- I -------
Decisions, plans , Service delivery
--------------------------- 
-- -----------
Transit agency Scheduling & Operational PassengersX staffeger
management planning staff staff
L---------------- A--------------------L -----
Information, feedback
- --------------------------------------------------
Figure 1-1: Transit service delivery as a business process [2].
The operations plan is the detailed plan which describes the utilization of the agency's
resources - rolling stock, personnel and infrastructure - in order to meet the service
policies. The most important components of the operations plan are the timetable
and the crew schedule. The timetable describes all train movements reflecting where
and when transportation service should be provided to customers. And the crew
schedule assigns drivers to trips, ensuring that all trips in the timetable are manned,
while respecting labour constraints.
The last piece under the transit agency's control is at the operational level, where
the operations plan is implemented. It includes all front-line staff (train operators,
17
estimation
station managers) as well as service controllers, crew managers, vehicle and infras-
tructure maintenance engineers and operational support personnel. Service control
(also, operations control or service management), which is an essential component at
the operational level, oversees and coordinates the implementation of the operations
plan and modifies it to deal with unforeseen events and short-term infeasibilities: It
is the central, real-time control function of schedule-based operations. Its centralized
nature, in which controllers are provided with information on the state of the entire
system, sets it apart from local dispatching techniques, where a supervisor is posi-
tioned at a terminal or a station along the line.
The service delivery process results in the daily operations which are provided to pas-
sengers. It is important to note that in daily operations, passengers do not experience
how the service was planned to be operated, they experience the actual operations.
This difference between planned and actual operations comes from the natural vari-
ability in operations, and from externalities (i.e. incidents) which cause disruptions.
A cost-optimized operations plan that aims to provide the most service at the least
cost might work very well under ideal operating conditions, but may stutter under
minor disruptions and fail completely under major disruptions. On the other hand, a
more robust operations plan may provide lower service levels and/or use more man-
power. But it is better able to continue functioning when minor disruptions strike, and
provide reasonable service with a quick recovery during a major disruption. Therefore,
it is possible that a robust schedule can provide better performance (i.e. passenger
service) on average, when considered over the full spectrum of operating conditions.
1.3 Why study robust crew scheduling
Crew scheduling is typically the last stage of the planning process at most transit
agencies. It is performed after timetabling, and is usually done in a way that mini-
mizes manpower cost while satisfying all the labour constraints. The problem with
this approach is that a minimum cost crew schedule may not be the best crew sched-
ule when things don't go as planned. As Carrel[2] and Rahbee[14] observe from their
study of the service control process on the London Underground, many service control
decisions during recovery after an incident are motivated by the need to get drivers
back to their crew bases on time, to the detriment of the passenger experience. A
robust crew schedule can reduce the need for such actions, and thereby improve av-
erage performance and/or reduce average operations costs.
Secondly, whenever changes are made to labour agreements or other crew-related mat-
ters, it is often assumed that the only impact will be lower or higher manpower costs.
But it is often the case that such changes also have an impact on the performance
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of the line. For instance, "fixed-link" was an agreement that was introduced at the
Arnos Grove depot of the Piccadilly Line in 2009 which imposed certain constraints
on the crew rostering process. In the process of satisfying these new constraints, the
mix of crew relief locations and directions changed in the subsequent crew schedule.
This unintended consequence had a negative effect on performance because the new
crew schedule was found to be less flexible during disruptions. Had the management
known this before the negotiation process started, they might have negotiated differ-
ently. Labour agreements are reviewed periodically, and it is in the interest of the
management to know beforehand how any proposed changes might impact the line's
performance.
1.4 Research objectives
This research has three objectives:
1. To analyse the structure of the crew schedule, identify the elements that make
the schedule robust and compare different schedules on the basis of these el-
ements. Such an analysis would deepen our understanding of what makes a
schedule robust, and give schedulers, service controllers and the line manage-
ment a way of predicting schedule performance.
2. To develop a simulation-based framework to evaluate the performance of a crew
schedule, and develop and validate a working model for the Piccadilly Line. The
model would simulate the performance of the schedule over a range of operating
conditions, and provide performance measures which are a measure of schedule
robustness.
3. To use the simulation model to perform a comparative evaluation of the per-
formance of two different Piccadilly Line crew schedules, and combine this with
the insights obtained from the structural comparison of the two crew schedules,
so as to provide insights into best practices for robust crew scheduling.
1.5 Research approach
This research aims to be of value to anyone interested in crew scheduling for a rail
transit line, specifically a high-frequency metro. While the research is motivated by
the desire of the London Underground to improve operational reliability on the Pic-
cadilly Line without expensive capital upgrades, the research is just as applicable
to any other rail transit system. The simulation model is first developed in a gen-
eral manner, and then the implementation of the model for the Piccadilly Line is
presented. Some of the details of the model, such as service control strategies, are
necessarily specific to the geometry, labour agreements and operating conditions of
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the line and cannot be generalized. However, a deliberate effort is made to keep the
discussion of the model as general as possible.
The objectives outlined above were achieved through the analysis of data available
from the London Underground, and by extended interactions with planners, duty
schedulers, service controllers, train operators, crew managers and the management
of the Piccadilly Line. The first objective involved a thorough analysis of the crew
schedules of the Piccadilly Line. This analysis led to insights on what made the
schedule robust, and also to the realization that a structural analysis would not be
sufficient to measure robustness, and that a simulation based model was needed.
Based on detailed observations during interactions with the Piccadilly Line staff and
analysis of train operations data from the London Underground, a simulation based
framework for the evaluation of the crew schedule's performance was formulated,
and a specific instance of the model was developed and validated for the Piccadilly
Line. This model is then used to perform a comparative evaluation of two crew
schedules.
1.6 Organization of the thesis
Chapter 2 gives a detailed introduction to the operations plan, including how it is
formulated, and showing how in daily operations, train service can deviate from the
plan. It then reviews past research and literature on robust scheduling and points
out the gaps which this research is intended to fill.
Chapter 3 analyses the structure of the crew schedule and identifies the elements that
make it robust. This analysis is done by comparing Piccadilly Line crew schedules
from two years that have the same underlying timetable but starkly different crew
schedules. While the analysis is performed on two Piccadilly Line crew schedules, the
inferences are kept general.
Chapter 4 discusses the shortcomings of the structural analysis approach to evaluate
robustness, and proposes an alternate framework based on simulation. This frame-
work is presented first in the context of a general rail transit line. Thereafter, details
of a specific implementation of the model for the Piccadilly Line are explained, in-
cluding detailed discussion on the inputs, methodology and outputs.
Chapter 5 validates the simulation model of the Piccadilly Line under a range of op-
erating conditions. The model is then used to perform a comparative analysis of the
performance of the same two crew schedules that were compared in Chapter 3 on the
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basis of their structures. The results of the simulation-based approach are combined
with that of the structural approach to provide some insights into best practices for
robust crew scheduling for the Piccadilly Line.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the research, highlights some of the
shortcomings and suggests directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Background & Literature
Review
This chapter presents the background information that provides the context of this re-
search. Section 2.1 provides an introduction to Transport for London and the London
Underground, Section 2.2, the Piccadilly Line. Section 2.3 provides an overview of
the Crew Scheduling process as it is performed in most transit agencies, and then dis-
cusses the specific case of the London Underground and the Piccadilly Line. Section
2.4 thoroughly discusses the function of real-time service control which is essential
to an understanding of robustness. Section 2.5 establishes the link between service
control and robust crew scheduling. Finally, Section 2.6 provides an overview of the
literature in this area.
2.1 Transport for London & the London Under-
ground
The public transport network of greater London is under the responsibility of Trans-
port for London (TfL), a local government body created in 2000 as part of the Greater
London Authority (GLA), and overseen by the office of the Mayor of London. TfL
has oversight and planning authority over all modes of public transport and the ur-
ban arterial street network within London, with the exception of most National Rail
suburban rail services. TfL manages approximately 700 bus routes, 11 heavy rail lines
which constitute the London Underground network, the London Overground heavy
rail lines, the Docklands Light Rail (DLR), a small tram network (Tramlink), the
Barclay's Bike Share network and the Emirates Airline cable car.
Operations are generally contracted out to private companies, with the exception of
the London Underground, which is operated by London Underground Ltd. (LUL),
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a subsidiary of TfL. The London Underground network is one of the largest metro
systems in the world carrying about 3.7 million passengers daily on a total length
of 402 line-km, approximately half of which is below ground. It is comprised of 207
stations on 11 lines, with many of the lines having multiple branches.
Figure 2-1 illustrates TfL's rail network, which consists primarily of Underground
lines. The Overground network is shown as dotted orange lines; Tramlink, which
serves the southern part of the region, is shown as a dotted green line; and the DLR
is shown as a dotted aqua line. The National Rail network, not managed by TfL,
is shown as a series of gray lines. The Piccadilly Line, which is the focus of this re-
search, is shown in dark blue. Altogether, the network is large, complex, and highly
interconnected.
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Figure 2-1: London's public transport network. [17]
Under the leadership of the Mayor of London, TfL has substantially expanded and im-
proved the region's public transportation network. Since 2000, several Underground
lines have been upgraded, the Overground network has been created, and the DLR
has been substantially extended and improved. Bus services have been expanded with
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increased operating hours and more frequent services. At the same time, the regional
government, working with local councils, has expanded the number of available bike
lanes, improved the walking environment, and introduced a congestion charge in cen-
tral London.
These initiatives have contributed to significant changes in the commute patterns of
residents of Greater London. As documented in the Travel in London report, the
public transport mode share of all journeys in the region has increased from 24% in
1993 to 35% in 2011, while that of private motorized vehicles (motor cycles, automo-
biles, and taxis) declined from 51% to 40% over the same period, while the share of
non-motorized modes (walking, bicycling) remained steady. In absolute terms, the
number of trips by various public transportation modes has increased by 55-95% in
this time period, while motorized trips have declined by 10%, and non-motorized
trips have increased by 20% (Figure 2-2). This is remarkable given that the region's
population has increased by about 1 million in this time period.
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Figure 2-2: Change in number of trips since 1993, by mode. [18]
The increased use of the public transport network can also be quantified in terms of
passenger entries into the system. In 2011, the TfL system provided more than 3.5
billion rides, of which 63% were provided by bus and 31% by the Underground. 2011
was a record year for the Underground in particular, with more than 1.1 billion rides.
Current estimates are that annual ridership will increase to 1.3 billion by 2015 [19].
London's continued population growth (it is expected to increase by a further 1.25
million by 2030) and increasing use of the public transport network demonstrates the
vital importance of providing efficient, reliable and comprehensive transport services
throughout the region.
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2.2 The Piccadilly Line
Though the simulation-based framework for evaluating the robustness of a crew sched-
ule that is developed in this thesis is general and can be applied to any rail transit
line, it has been motivated by and is applied to the Piccadilly Line. Therefore, this
section describes some of the salient features of the LU Piccadilly Line.
The Piccadilly Line is a heavy rail transit line that of 71 kilometers, the second longest
in the LU system (after the Central Line), and serves 52 stations. Figure 2-3 (adapted
from [5]), shows the geometry of the line along with the service pattern. The line
runs from Cockfosters in North London, through the center of London, and then to
two western branches-one to Heathrow Airport and the other to Uxbridge. Along
the way, the line serves many important stations, including Arsenal, King's Cross-St.
Pancras, Piccadilly Circus and the theatre district, and the museum district in South
Kensington. The central section of the line is in a deep tube that first opened in 1869,
but most of the branch sections run on the surface or on embankments.
Figure 2-3: The geometry and service pattern of the Piccadilly Line
As Figure 2-3 shows, LU provides a range of service at rush hour to different parts
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of the line. The central section, from Acton Town to Arnos Grove, is scheduled for a
peak service of 24 trains per hour. The Heathrow branch also receives more service
than the Uxbridge branch, both because of the importance of connecting to the air-
port and also because the Rayner's Lane---Uxbridge section of the line is shared with
the Metropolitan Line, which offers more direct and more frequent service to central
London.
The four-track section of the line between Ealing Common and Earl's Court is shared
with the District Line, which operates as a "local" service to the "express" Piccadilly
Line (the two services are on separate, but adjacent tracks), which serves fewer sta-
tions.
Service is generally operated from 5:30 to 0:30, with 894 scheduled one-way trips on
the line. Not all the trips operate from terminus to terminus; many trips terminate
at Arnos Grove and at Rayner's Lane.
The Piccadilly Line has two depots: at Northfields, and at Cockfosters. In addi-
tion there are a number of sidings (Acton Town, Arnos Grove, South Harrow and
Uxbridge) where small numbers of trains are stabled overnight. . The Piccadilly Line
has two crew bases - at Acton Town and at Arnos Grove - and these are the locations
where crew changes take place. Finally, the service control facility is located at Earl's
Court.
The Piccadilly Line, which runs through some of London's most popular residen-
tial districts as well as many of its major destinations, serves more than 210 million
annual journeys, making it the fourth busiest line on the LU network. Congestion,
as on the TfL system in general, is heavily concentrated at peak times and in the
central area. Figures 2-4 and 2-5 show the flows on the Piccadilly Line vis-a-vis the
capacity during the peak thirty minutes of the morning peak, for the eastbound and
westbound directions respectively [15].
It is observed that westbound trains operate at capacity (5 standing passengers per
square meter) between King's Cross and Holborn, and eastbound trains are nearly
as crowded coming into Acton Town from the Heathrow branch. This implies that
passengers are often uncomfortably packed into trains or left waiting on platforms.
It also implies that even a single missed train during the peaks can have significant
passenger impacts.
This thesis focuses on the Piccadilly Line in part because the service is one of TfL's
most important. Its ridership is likely to increase over the next decade as London's
population continues to increase and Heathrow Airport and King's Cross-St. Pancras
are expected to become even more popular than they are today. But just as important
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Figure 2-4: Peak thirty minute (AM) flow on the Piccadilly Line - Eastbound [15]
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Figure 2-5: Peak thirty minute (AM) flow on the Piccadilly Line - Westbound [15]
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to the selection of the Piccadilly Line as the subject of this analysis is the fact that
the line is years away from a major technology upgrade. Though the service has been
well maintained for decades, it is handicapped by having some of the oldest trains
in the system (dating from 1973), an antiquated signaling technology, and decaying
capital infrastructure resulting from the line's age.
The TfL business plan suggests that capital improvements are many years off, though
the Mayor's Transport Strategy notes that there is an effort to provide the Piccadilly
Line "new trains, more capacity and quicker journeys" [10]. Upgrades for the Pic-
cadilly Line are expected in the "2020-30s" period. Moreover, any alternative invest-
ments that will lead to reduced stress on the line are unlikely in the medium term.
The Victoria Line, which parallels the Piccadilly Line for much of its route, is often
even more crowded. And the proposed "Crossrail 2"-a new service mentioned in
the Mayor's Transport Strategy that would run between Chelsea and Hackney (and
could parallel the Piccadilly Line from Wood Green and King's Cross to Piccadilly
Circus)-has yet to be funded, let alone begun construction [9]. These conditions
make the Piccadilly Line an ideal choice for this important case study.
2.3 The crew scheduling process
2.3.1 The service planning process
The operations plan is, generally speaking, the set of plans which fully describe the
utilization of transit agency resources in daily operations under ideal conditions. It
is designed to meet the service policy requirements set forth by management while
complying with crew work rules, vehicle management and infrastructure maintenance
requirements. Typically the operations plan is built around the service plan. While
the service plan is focused on customer services, that is, all train movements in pas-
senger service, the operations plan includes everything needed to produce the service
plan, including a working timetable (including train movements which are not in pas-
senger service), a crew schedule, and a crew roster.
The crew schedule develops driver shifts to cover all parts of the working timetable,
and the crew roster then links individual employees to those shifts. The crew roster
development process is agency-specific and depends heavily on agreements between
management and unions in terms of work rules. The published timetable is the most
important component of the operations plan. In a sense, it is a promise by the agency
to the customer. However, the timetable is also very important for asset management
and strategic planning on a metro system.
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The operations planning process is described in detail by Ceder[3]. It consists of
four steps: network route design, timetable development, vehicle scheduling and crew
scheduling. In an existing metro system, network design will not be of great impor-
tance, leaving the three other steps to be repeated whenever a new operations plan
is needed.
The primary scheduling parameter for high-frequency rail services is the service fre-
quency per line section by time-of-day, which is a function of passenger demand,
maximum and minimum headway constraints and infrastructure characteristics. It
is usually expressed in trains per hour (tph). The timetable development process
builds on the above mentioned factors and service frequency policies. Furthermore,
it requires running times, dwell times, layover times and capacity limitations as input.
Historically, these variables were primarily derived from models and assumptions since
operational data were difficult to collect and often involved significant uncertainties.
However, as many transit agencies have installed digital signaling and train control
systems in recent years, the availability, accessibility and quality of operational data
have greatly improved and the roles of data analysis and modeling in the operations
planning process are shifting. Where possible, the analysis of operational data can
provide information on many of the variables mentioned above without a direct need
for models. The increased availability of data can also assist in the development and
calibration of better predictive models to determine the effect of future changes.
The result of the timetable development is a set of individual end-to-end train trips
on the line which constitute the timetable for passenger service. The last step in the
operations planning process is crew scheduling, which aims to define crew duty pieces
such that all vehicle movements have a driver assigned to them, typically at minimal
overall crew cost, while satisfying all the crew constraints. Aside from the scheduled
crews, a number of spare operators are allocated to crew depots to cover for absences
and unforeseen needs. In this thesis, the terms crew, operator and driver are used
synonymously, as are the terms timetable and schedule.
2.3.2 Crew scheduling constraints on the Piccadilly Line
The previous section described the service planning process as it is generally carried
out in a transit agency. This section focuses on one aspect of service planning, namely
crew scheduling, and with specific reference to the Piccadilly Line. This is not a dis-
cussion of the general crew scheduling process, which is discussed at length in [3].
Rather, the subject of interest here is the specific constraints on crew scheduling that
are present in the case of the Piccadilly Line. In Chapter 3, the structure of Pic-
cadilly Line crew schedules is analyzed; this section merely discusses the constraints
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that result in that structure.
Crew scheduling (or duty scheduling as it is referred to in the London Underground)
refers to the process of assigning crews to scheduled trains runs in the vehicle schedule
(or the timetable). A train's crew might consist of just a driver or train operator,
as is the case with the London Underground, or might have more than one person,
which is common in the case of inter-city trains. A crew has to be assigned to every
single scheduled train movement, which includes not just train movements that carry
passengers, but other train movements such as depot moves and deadheading.
Furthermore, this assignment must be performed in a manner that does not violate
any agreements that govern how much and what kind of work a person can perform.
These agreements, typically signed between the management of a transit service and
labour unions place restrictions on what drivers can or cannot do, and therefore con-
strain the process of crew scheduling. The conventional approach to crew scheduling
has been to build a schedule that satisfies the operations plan without violating any
crew constraints at minimum cost, which usually means, using the least amount of
manpower. The problems with a purely cost-minimizing approach to crew schedul-
ing are well known, and many leading transit agencies today try to build in some
resiliency or robustness into their crew schedules at the cost of more manpower.
In the case of the Piccadilly Line, there are a number of constraints on the drivers.
Drivers cannot be scheduled to drive for more than four hours and fifteen minutes
without a meal break, and their duty cannot be longer than eight hours (excluding
the meal break). The meal break must be atleast thirty minutes long, in addition to
an agreed upon time to walk to and from the meal-room. Similarly, there are agreed
upon allowances for the time required to check-in, to walk (from the crew base to the
platform or siding or depot), to prepare or stable a train etc. There are restrictions
on how early duties can start, or how late they can finish. A certain number of duties
can start very early or finish very late to allow for early pull-outs and late pull-ins at
the depots. Not all duties start at the crew bases; some duties start at the depots,
though there are restrictions on how many drivers are allowed to check-in directly at
the depot.
In addition to these hard constraints, there are also soft constraints which are usu-
ally a result of driver or service controller preferences. For instance, meal breaks are
not scheduled at certain periods of the day because of driver preference. Eastbound
reliefs at Arnos Grove and Westbound reliefs at Acton Town are prioritized because
service controllers find that they have more flexibility with these reliefs. There are
also minimum late running margins which are incorporated into the crew schedule as
hard or soft constraints to increase schedule robustness.
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In addition to the above constraints on driver duties, there are also constraints in the
rostering process. The average duty length across all the duties in a roster must equal
36 hours per week. There is a single roster for all Acton Town duties, and six rosters
for Arnos Grove duties. These six rosters correspond to six links or times of the day
when duties start (eg. Dead early, intermediate early, dead late etc.) Therefore, the
average duty length constraint applies individually to each of these six rosters. This
is known as the fixed-shift link constraint, and its effects on the crew schedule are
discussed in Chapter 3. Drivers are allowed to take a fixed number of leaves in a
year, and the roster includes spare operators to cover for drivers who are on vacation.
There is also a required number of spare drivers who must be present to cover for
sickness, casual absenteeism etc. In addition to this, some more spare drivers can be
scheduled to increase schedule robustness.
2.4 Service control
In daily operations, the train service can deviate from the service plan for a number
of reasons including variability in passenger demand, variability in driver behavior,
unforeseen operating conditions, or incidents. Due to these events, the actual opera-
tions may deviate from the schedule, and certain parts of the operations plan, such
as scheduled crew movements may even become infeasible.
Service control can be described as the work of modifying the operations plan in real-
time to deal with the aforementioned unforeseen events. It is a process which is both
proactive and reactive. Some constraints are known before they become immediately
relevant for service delivery; for instance, the availability of rolling stock at the be-
ginning of service can be limited due to maintenance requirements or defective trains,
or certain track sections might be unavailable due to engineering work. In that case,
service controllers can plan ahead and modify the schedule in order to allocate the
remaining resources optimally and avoid conflicts.
However, more commonly, service control must deal with disruptions and train delays
as they occur, causing deviations from the schedule. Section 2.4.1 examines the com-
mon types of disruptions and schedule deviations in more detail. From the service
controller's point of view, these events immediately affect service quality or make
the schedule infeasible, thus requiring controllers to reschedule service in order to
maintain it at the best possible level, subject to the momentary constraints, and to
eventually restore the full level of service.
The real-time control of a transit line functions much like a control loop, in which
the two elements are the service control center and the operations on the transit line.
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The service controllers constantly monitor the state of the system and compare indi-
cators of the level of service to the service plan and to other service quality objectives.
Deviations will cause controllers to perform corrective interventions (a list of possible
interventions will be given in Section 2.4.2).
The choice of intervention is informed by the service controller's knowledge of the
system, the momentary constraints, the target state (which is often the timetable)
and a projection of the effect of the intervention on the system; this process is explored
in Section 2.4.3. For a more comprehensive treatment of service control for rail transit
lines, the reader is referred to [2] from which some of this material is adapted.
2.4.1 Disruptions and schedule deviations
A disruption (or incident) is defined as a single, unforeseen event which causes one
(or more) trains to be unable to complete their trips as scheduled. A disruption has
a beginning and an end in time and a location at which its effects are felt. This is in
contrast to congestion from demand peaks and routine variability, which can gener-
ally cause different running times and dwell times than the schedule sets out. Uniman
[20] refers to the result of congestion (and small regularly occurring anomalies) as re-
current unreliability in contrast to the aforementioned disruption-related unreliability
and shows that the effects in terms of passenger travel times can be distinctly different.
The consequence of disruptions and delays from congestion is a train service that
deviates from the service plan, which will henceforth be referred to as a disrupted
service. Although delayed trains are the most common form of disrupted service,
there can also be early trains or trains which are completely missing from service
(e.g., they become defective and are withdrawn). An understanding of the different
types of disruptions and service deviations is essential for studying robustness since
robustness measures the resilience of a schedule to disruptions. The rest of this sub-
section discusses the typical causes and effects of disruptions in a rail transit line.
Causes of disruptions
The cause of a service disruption can be endogenous or exogenous to the transit sys-
tem. Exogenous causes can be, for example, a passenger operating the emergency
alarm, an object on the tracks or weather (on open track sections.) These causes are
basically beyond the direct control of the transit agency. The occurrence of disrup-
tions with endogenous causes, on the other hand, can be influenced by the transit
agency's maintenance procedures, accountability structures, and employee discipline
policies. Examples of endogenous causes are defective trains, infrastructure problems
(such as signal failures), staff communication errors or the unavailability of a driver
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or train.
Despite their varied causes, disruptions usually manifest themselves on the train ser-
vice in a limited number of ways:
" Stationary line blockage: A blocked train is not able to leave the station it
is berthed at or proceed beyond a certain point on the line. Since it is generally
not possible for trains in rapid transit systems to pass each other, a train which
is blocked on the line will not only be delayed, but will also cause following
trains to queue behind it and thus be delayed.
" Slow-moving line blockage: This might be caused by a defective train which
is able to move only at a reduced speed. Unlike the stationary blockage, ser-
vice from affected stations does not come to a standstill, but travel times are
increased, not only for the defective train but also (as a function of the service
frequency) for those following it.
" Single train delay: This type of delay is experienced by one single train
without directly affecting other trains in the depot or on the line. It could, for
example, be a train which pulls out of its depot late because no train operator
was available at its scheduled pull-out.
" Train blocked in terminal: A train might not be able to depart a terminal
for various reasons. The effect on other trains depends very much on the specific
terminal configuration, but in a typical stub-end terminal with more than one
reversing track, this will not result in a complete blockage. Instead, the capacity
of the terminal is reduced and following trains are only able to reverse at a
reduced frequency.
" Reduced infrastructure capacity: Unlike the aforementioned disruptions,
this phenomenon does not necessarily involve a train. Reduced infrastructure
capacity can be caused by track, switch or trackside equipment failures, resulting
either in temporary slow zones or sections of the line becoming unusable. For
instance, a track failure may cause a certain section of a line to have only one
usable track for both directions, resulting in reduced capacity.
Effect on the service
The effect on the service can be defined from either the agency's or the passenger's
perspective. This difference is especially important when considering high-frequency
metro lines where passengers can be expected to arrive randomly, without referring
to a published timetable. In this case, from the passenger's perspective, important
variables of service quality are platform waiting time (which is a function of expected
headways and headway variance) and on-train travel time, which is directly related
to service speed, but not necessarily schedule adherence.
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However, from the agency's point of view, the degree of adherence to the operations
plan (and thus to the crew and vehicle schedules) is of critical importance. Disrup-
tions can cause both a deviation from the schedule (i.e., train or driver lateness) and
a deviation from service quality standards. The two effects, although correlated, are
not necessarily in a direct cause-and-effect relationship.
For instance, it may be possible to maintain regular headways as scheduled on a line
section despite trains running late due to an earlier disruption. That would be a devi-
ation from the schedule, but a passenger waiting for a train would experience service
at the expected headways, and there would be no deviation in service quality with
regard to regular headways. In such a situation, the drivers in the different trains
may be running late. While this does not affect the passenger experience directly, it is
possible that service control interventions will be performed to reduce driver lateness
(so as to maintain the feasibility of the crew schedule or reduce overtime costs), and
these interventions may ultimately affect the passenger experience.
Fundamentally, a disruption can cause a gap in the service (possibly followed by
bunched trains), an incorrect sequence of trains, general lateness or a combination of
these effects. The possible impacts on passengers vary depending on the situation.
A gap caused by a line blockage (whether stationary or slow-moving) will often be
followed by a group of delayed trains with short headways, depending on the duration
of the blockage and the scheduled service frequency on the line. The primary impact
on passengers is through long waiting times during the gap and crowding in the first
train or series of trains after the gap. The first train or few trains after the gap may
also experience longer than scheduled running times due to passenger congestion.
Once these effects have "passed", passengers essentially experience regular headways
and might classify the service as "good". However, from the agency's point of view,
there will be a series of trains and drivers on the line which are delayed with respect
to the schedule, and this may be undesirable for various reasons.
A single train delay, on the other hand, can cause a trip not to be covered, resulting
in a gap of two headways between two other trains which are running on time. The
delayed train might enter service later, out of sequence. To passengers, the gap has
the same effect as described above (increased waiting times, potential crowding on the
first train after the gap), and the first train after the gap may experience increased
running times. However, from the point of view of service control, the number of
trains which are off schedule is smaller than in the above case (generally only one or
two), and the spacing between trains after the gap is generally more consistent with
the timetable than after a blockage.
As mentioned above, a single train delay can cause a train to enter service out of
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sequence. On lines with branches, delays on one branch do not immediately affect
the other branches, but, a different train sequence from that in the timetable can
result when trains then merge onto the common trunk section. While this deviation
from the schedule may not matter to passengers as long as regular headways are
maintained, it may be problematic for the agency.
General lateness with respect to the timetable can occur if the scheduled running
times are inadequate, for example during peak hours with high demand and passen-
ger congestion. It can also result from disruptions where the throughput capacity of
the line or a terminal is reduced. Therefore, passengers may experience longer overall
travel times as a result, but general lateness need not be accompanied by any gaps
in the service or changes in train sequence.
2.4.2 Service control interventions
During a disruption, the main service control tasks are to coordinate the responses
to the disruption, maintain an adequate level of service on line sections not directly
affected by it and avoid conflicts between trains. This task is known as disruption
management. Once a disruption has cleared or peak demand has abated, service
controllers move into the phase of service recovery, also known as service restoration,
where they work with real-time information and a toolbox of changes they can make
to the system to achieve an ultimate target state (typically the service plan).
Collectively these changes will be referred to as service control interventions. The
controller's choice of intervention is driven by a set of constraints, objectives and pri-
orities, which are either defined by agency policy or informally by the controllers. An
intervention usually applies to an individual train. Together, the set the interventions
which are performed in order to restore service to its target state constitute the ser-
vice recovery strategy. It is important to note that when analyzing service recovery,
the strategy must be considered as a whole - the purpose of individual interventions
may not be clear unless one understands how they fit into the overall strategy.
Another point to bear in mind is the strong linkage between the train schedule and
the crew schedule. Although in the planning process the crew schedule is developed
given the train schedule, in daily operations the two constantly need to be coordi-
nated to deal with variations in service patterns and resource availability, in order
to ensure that each train trip has a crew. A change to a train's trajectory (e.g., a
diversion to a different destination) will always change a driver's trajectory and his
or her original schedule.
The remainder of this section presents a comprehensive list of train-related and crew-
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related interventions which service controllers can perform. Crew-related interven-
tions affect crew assignments but not train routings. Train-related interventions, on
the other hand, affect trains and crews alike. In looking at the list, the reader will
realize that, in order to achieve a certain outcome (e.g., put a late train back on
schedule), there are many different possible interventions from which a controller can
choose. Also, many of these interventions often need to be performed in tandem to
achieve a desired outcome.
Train-related interventions
* Short-turn: A train which is short-turned is reversed before it reaches its
scheduled destination. This can be done either to fill a gap in the opposite
direction or to reduce its lateness by shortening its cycle time. Trains can
also be short-turned upstream of a blockage in order to prevent a queue from
forming. On-board passengers with destinations beyond the short-turn point
need to alight and wait for the next train to their destination.
" Withdrawal: A train which is prematurely withdrawn from passenger service
into a siding or depot is another form of intervention. This can happen at the
terminal or at a siding along the line. The effect on passengers is the same as in
a short-turn. This may be done because the train becomes defective, or because
the train driver needs to be relieved but no relief driver is available. In addition,
withdrawing trains can be used as a disruption management technique in times
of reduced capacity.
* Diversion: On lines with branches, trains with a destination on one of the
branches can be diverted to serve another branch instead. The objective might
be to fill a gap on the branch to which the train is being diverted or to withdraw
it to a depot located at the end of that branch. However, on branches with
different cycle times a diversion can also be performed in order to shorten the
cycle time of a late train or to lengthen the cycle time of an early train. The
impact on passengers to the original branch is the same as if the train were short-
turned. If a diversion takes effect after the train departs a terminal, passengers
traveling to stations on the original branch will need to alight and wait for the
next train serving their branch.
" Trip Cancellation: Unlike a short-turn, withdrawal or diversion, in which
a train does not operate part of the trip it was scheduled for, a canceled trip
is not operated in its entirety. Service controllers can cancel a trip if there are
not sufficient resources (trains and drivers) available to operate it. However,
cancellations may also serve as a disruption management or service restoration
technique. Controllers may temporarily remove a train from service and cancel
one or more round trips, then insert it back into service at a later point. This
can serve as a technique for putting late trains back on schedule, or it can
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be done to reduce congestion and facilitate real-time train management during
disruptions. On high-frequency line sections where passengers arrive randomly,
they will most likely not be aware of the missing train, but they will experience
longer waiting times or more crowded trains.
9 Renumbering: When a service controller renumbers a train, the assignment
between the train (or rolling stock) and trip changes. This means that the
train is now associated with a different vehicle block, and thus a different set
of scheduled trips to be operated. Renumbering trains is typically associated
with one of the aforementioned changes in routing (a diversion, an extension or a
short-turn). In the event that a train is renumbered to a train/trip number with
the same original destination, the controller's intent most likely is to assign it to
a scheduled trip for which it is on time. It is important to note that renumbering
trains in such a case without any other intervention only affects the lateness of
a train with respect to the timetable; the driver's lateness does not change.
9 Holding at stations: This intervention consists of delaying the departure
of a train from a station beyond the end of its normal dwell time. Trains may
be held to even out headways, to ensure on-time departures if they are running
early or for connections with other trains. During blockages, trains can be held
downstream of the blocked train in order to counteract the formation of a gap
and they can be held upstream to avoid the formation of a queue.
* Expressing: Expressing is a technique in which a train in passenger service
skips one or more stops it was scheduled to serve. Passengers on board that
train must alight if their destination is one of the skipped stops, and passengers
waiting at those stops experience an increase in waiting time as they wait for
the next stopping train.
e Extension: An extended train travels past its scheduled destination to a
station located beyond it. There is no negative impact on passengers on board
the train as all scheduled stops are served. The degree to which passengers to
the "new" destination(s) benefit depends on when the extension is announced.
An extension can be performed to fill a gap, withdraw a train to a depot or to
lengthen its cycle time.
e Adding service: Passenger service can be added in the form of unscheduled
train trips which were originally not part of the service plan. This may be
achieved by using a spare train or a train which was withdrawn from another
part of the line. Train service can be added either to supplement scheduled
services if they prove to provide insufficient capacity to serve passenger demand
or to fill gaps caused by disruptions. Trains which need to be moved from one
depot to another can be run in passenger service if they do not have any major
defects, thus providing a benefit to passengers at little extra cost.
e Adding an out-of-service trip: This intervention is effectively an unplanned
deadhead, which refers to any train movement on the line which is not in pas-
senger service. There is a large variety of reasons for such trips, but they are
39
generally related to moving trains or drivers from a point in the line where they
are no longer needed to their new site of operation or to the depot.
9 Train priority at junctions and terminals: At any junction where branches
merge, and at terminals, service control must establish a train priority scheme.
The planned form of this scheme may be embedded in the automatic signaling
system and can be as simple as "first come, first served". Trains can also be
held, either to their scheduled sequence or as an intervention to establish a
desired service pattern downstream.
Crew-related interventions
* Substituting a spare driver: Replacing a rostered driver with a spare driver
is one form of crew-related intervention. For example, such an intervention can
be used to relieve a late-running driver who needs to step off but has not yet
completed his/her driving assignment.
* Dropping back: Dropping back in a planned form is a crew scheduling
technique which allows the train layover time at a terminal to be shortened
without compromising the driver layover time. Specifically, every driver steps
off his/her train at the terminal, takes a break and then departs on the following
train. Dropping back can also be imposed by service controllers as an ad-hoc
intervention to speed up the reversal process with the help of a spare driver.
e Jumping up: On a line where drivers are planned to drop back, the interven-
tion called "jumping up" refers to a change back to every driver departing with
the same train that he or she arrived on, i.e., a discontinuation of the policy of
dropping back.
e Switching drivers: If trains need to be resequenced, this can easily be
done by renumbering them, but more importantly the drivers may need to be
resequenced - one driver needs to move to a train ahead of his/her train and
the other needs to move to a train behind. If the two drivers are at a terminal
at the same time or meet each other on the way, a cross-platform driver change
is possible. This might be problematic since it compromises the layover time of
one of the drivers. To avoid this, controllers can work with a spare driver, for
example as follows. The drivers of trains 1 and 2, both for the same destination
and where train 2 is following train 1, need to be switched. The two drivers
shall be called driver 10 (on train 1) and driver 20 (on train 2). A spare driver
steps onto train 2 a few stations short of the terminal. Driver 20 waits at that
station and steps onto train 1 after train 1 has reversed. Driver 10 then steps
off and waits for train 2, where he or she replaces the spare driver. Using this
technique, driver 10 had a layover at the terminal, whereas driver 20 had a
layover at the station where the spare driver stepped on.
o Stock and crew: Stock and crew functions similarly to switching drivers; it
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is a technique for moving late trains (and late drivers) forward in the timetable
without short-turning the train. However, it only works if there is a spare train
and driver available at the terminal. While the late train is traveling towards the
terminal in passenger service, the spare driver with the spare train departs the
terminal at the time the late train was scheduled. The late train and the spare
train meet at a station and the two drivers switch trains across the platform.
The spare train then receives the number of the scheduled train and continues
on its path whereas the train heading towards the terminal becomes the new
spare train and is stabled by the spare driver. As with the crew changeover
described above, a problem might arise because the original driver does not get
a layover at the terminal.
2.4.3 The service control process
Service control needs a set of simple, real-time performance measures through which
the operations on a line are evaluated in real-time and compared to their target state
defined by the service or operations plan. These performance measures largely define
the decision rules and priorities for service control.
Common supply-centric measures can be headway regularity, lateness of service or
total missed trips. The last two measures define schedule adherence, and headway
regularity is featured separately because it can be independent from schedule adher-
ence. Passenger-centric measures might include total passenger delays or travel time
reliability metrics, but they are generally much more difficult to calculate in real-time
and to relate to the service variables which controllers can influence. Adherence to
the crew schedules is currently not explicitly tracked by the London Underground,
though as we shall see, crew management is a major driver of service control decisions.
Based on these measures, the state of the system is monitored in real time. When
a disruption occurs (as described in Section 2.4.1), the state of the system changes
and it may become necessary for the service controller to intervene, in ways that were
described in the previous section. In this section, the primary drivers behind service
control are examined, as well as the service strategies that are employed.
The overarching objective of the service controllers of the Piccadilly Line (and likely
for most rail transit lines) is to operate as many trips as possible, and to operate
those trips as close to schedule as possible. This objective is based on the premise
that the timetable is the optimal service output, and that achieving this objective
automatically achieves the ultimate objective of providing the best service for the
passenger.
It is important to note that headway regularity is not explicitly embedded in the
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above objective, even though it is one of the (if not the) most important determinant
of service quality in a high-frequency metro. One reason for this could be that service
controllers are not directly provided with information on headways, as their informa-
tion systems only report train lateness. It is also not possible to observe headways
from the on-screen displays because they are often not to scale. Furthermore, the
job of maintaining regular headways is often relegated to signal controllers who may
decide to hold trains to regulate headways.
Although, schedule adherence is treated as the main objective, it is possible during
some disruptions that the target system state is not the operations plan, but some
other feasible plan. This is especially the case during very severe disruptions or partial
line suspensions when it is realized that the best course of action is often to operate
a reduced and simplified service.
The primary driver for controller intervention is train lateness, which is often but not
always the same as driver lateness. In the case of the Piccadilly Line, ten minutes is
often used as a threshold for train lateness when making a decision on whether or not
to intervene. This is because the service controllers feel that trains that are late by
ten minutes or less have a fairly good chance of making up (some of) that lateness in
their recovery time.
It is important to note that service controllers are not explicitly made aware of driver
lateness or how much slack time a driver has. While it is possible for them to calcu-
late this from the crew schedule, the demanding nature of the job especially during
disruptions, means that this is impractical. As a result, service controllers use the
minimum slack as a proxy for deciding when to intervene. As will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 3, the crew schedule ensures that most drivers have at least ten
minutes of slack time, and therefore, it is not essential to intervene and put those
trains back on time.
But in general, it would be correct to say that crew constraints are the biggest driver
of controller actions. Section 2.3.2 discussed many of the constraints that drivers
need to adhere to, such as a maximum continuous driving time of four hours and
thirty minutes etc. While the crew schedule is built to ensure that these constraints
are satisfied, that may not be true during a disruption. A driver who has exceeded
the maximum permitted driving time is entitled to park the train at a siding and
wait for his relief. However, several controllers indicated that in the case of serious
disruptions, drivers will generally be understanding if the driving time regulations are
breached, as long as they can assume that controllers are working to minimize the
excess driving time.
Another reason that lateness of more than ten minutes is actively corrected is that
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a driver who gets off a train late might be late for their next run. This might not
always be the case depending on the late running margin (or slack time) that the
driver has, but this is not something that the service controllers are actively aware of.
Similarly, it might not be advisable for the driver getting on to the train to use up all
the slack right at the beginning of the run in case there is a disruption later in the day.
Finally, trains are put back on time because service controllers wish to avoid drivers
starting their runs late. This is partly because controllers do not have a means of
directly talking to drivers in the depots, and need to rely on the Duty Managers in
the depots to inform a driver about which train to board. Any confusion in this
operation might result in a line blockage because the driver is not at the right place
at the right time. Because of the scope for misinformation in this process, controllers
prefer to have drivers start their runs with minimal lateness.
Thus, in most cases it is okay for drivers to step off their train a little late, but not
to step on late. Therefore, service controllers use a combination of renumbering and
rerouting delayed trains in order to put drivers back in time for their reliefs. This
strategy is illustrated in the following example (Figure 2-6).
Consider the case of two trains 240 and 241 that are scheduled as described in the
table below. They travel past AGR (this could be any station) in the Eastbound
(EB) direction to CFS, where they reverse, and then travel through AGR Westbound
(WB). Also assume that both trains are scheduled to have a crew change at AGR-WB.
Now consider the case when both of these trains are running 15 minutes late because
of a disruption on the line. In the absence of controller intervention the trains would
arrive at their relief locations about 15 minutes late (they might make up some time
at the terminus, if there is recovery time available). Therefore, the drivers would get
off 15 minutes late, which might be acceptable if they have 15 minutes of slack time,
or don't have any other runs afterwards. The drivers who are getting on to the trains
would then start their runs 15 minutes late, and may be using up all their slack time
at the beginning of their run.
In order to avoid this situation, the following operation is possible:
" Short-turn train 241 at AGR.
" Renumber train 240 at 241, and train 241 as 240 at AGR-WB.
If the above interventions were performed, the table below describes what would hap-
pen. Train 240 would arrive at AGR-WB 15 minutes late, but would leave on time as
train 241. Train 241 would arrive at AGR 15 minutes early for the relief, and would
depart AGR-WB on time as train 240. The driver of train 240 gets off 15 minutes
late, and the driver of train 241 gets off 15 minutes early. But the two new drivers
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AGR-WB
AGR-EB
Original Departure Times
Train # AGR-EB
10:00
10:15
Modified Departure Times
Train # AGR-EB
240
241
10:15
10:30
10:30 10:45 as 241
10:30 as 240
Figure 2-6: Example of a renumbering operation
both start their runs on time, which was the desired end result.
The negative consequence of this strategy is the fact that one AGR-CFS-AGR round
trip was cancelled. In the case of the Piccadilly Line, this might be an acceptable
compromise because AGR is very close to CFS, and the demand in that section is
extremely low.
This strategy can be varied in many different ways depending on the exact configura-
tion of the crew reliefs, the availability of spare drivers, the necessity of maintaining
service to the end of the line and other factors. But the above example captures the
spirit of the strategy of renumbering and rerouting trains in order to reduce driver
lateness.
In general, controllers frequently employ recovery strategies which hinge on crew re-
liefs. Crew reliefs act as "fixed points" in the timetable, and controllers often reroute
and renumber late trains to meet these departures as scheduled, because in doing so,
they are simultaneously restoring service to the timetable and meeting crew manage-
ment constraints.
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CFS
240
241
10:15
10:30
10:30
10:45
. .. . ............. - _ _ _ - ..... ... .......... . .......... ....... 
Controllers have the option of using spare drivers to operate some trips. This may
become necessary when the scheduled driver is close to his maximum driving time,
or when a driver who is supposed to step onto a train is unavailable for some reason
(such as a late arrival from the previous run), or in many other scenarios. Based
on conversations with multiple Piccadilly Line controllers, controllers try not to rely
heavily on spare drivers because the availability of spare drivers is not always know
reliably beforehand.
This concludes our discussion of service control. In this section, we have explored
common disruptions that take place in a rail transit line, what service control inter-
ventions are possible to deal with such disruptions, and the service control process
that is followed to determine what interventions are actually used in resolving the
problem. The next section explores the link between service control and robust crew
scheduling.
2.5 Service control and robust crew scheduling
Figure 1-1 showed a flow of decisions from the management level to the planning
& scheduling teams and on to the operations level, but at the same time, a flow of
information is needed from the operational level back to planning & scheduling and
management. What these connections describe is in fact a very strong bidirectional
link between service control and operations planning & scheduling. This interaction
can best be understood by revisiting the operations planning process. The inputs used
for scheduling are usually data on running times and dwell times, and assumptions or
models of scheduling variables for which insufficient (or) no data are available, such
as layover times, throughput capacity and junction and terminal capacity.
The validity of the assumptions or models can only be assessed with the help of data
gathered during operations. Planners can also use operational data to identify bottle-
necks, for example by analyzing the origin of delays, the variance of certain variables
in daily operations or levels of train impedance.
However, it is very important to recognize that the system being analyzed is not a
system of autonomous actors (i.e., trains, drivers and passengers), but rather a sys-
tem which is controlled by a central, intelligent entity (service control) which has an
understanding of the state of the entire network and can influence individual actors
within its control (trains and drivers) to change that state. That means that the data
being observed (e.g., running times, dwell times) may tell an incomplete story with-
out being linked to service control interventions, and that this, in turn, can distort
the models used for determining scheduling variables.
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An excellent example of this relationship comes from the process of crew scheduling.
A certain amount of slack time is included in every single duty in order to mitigate
the effects of lateness and ensure that the duty does not become infeasible the mo-
ment a train is late. The amount of slack to include usually depends on the typical
train lateness at the time of relief. This lateness can be observed from train tracking
(AVL) data, but the lateness thus calculated is the lateness that was present after
any service control interventions. Thus we see that service control actions influence
the data used in operations planning.
Another example of this reverse feedback is the mix of crew relief directions. When
crew reliefs take place at a non-terminal station (as is the case with the Piccadilly
Line), it is possible to schedule reliefs in either direction at that relief location. Clearly
there are a large number of relief configurations that are possible by varying the time,
location and direction of individual reliefs. If the service is running as planned, there is
little to choose from between the reliefs, and the best configuration of reliefs would be
one that satisfies all crew constraints at minimum cost. However, when a disruption
occurs, this is not the case. Service controllers are acutely aware that different types
of reliefs have different advantages and disadvantages, and offer varying amounts of
flexibility during service recovery. Therefore, the choice of an ideal set of crew reliefs
depends on the ability of service controllers to work with those reliefs when dealing
with the type of disruptions that typically affect the line.
The manner in which service control manages disruptions also provides valuable in-
put to service planning. By understanding how disruption management strategies are
implemented as a function of its parameters (e.g., train frequency, scheduled recov-
ery time), by investigating where spare network capacity such as reversing tracks or
crossovers is used and what resources (e.g., spare trains and drivers) are required for
disruption management, planners can try to accommodate service control better in
the planning process. For instance, they can restrict the usage of these resources in
the operations plan or make them easy to reallocate in the event of a disruption.
Furthermore, understanding service control can also help an analyst understand which
parts of the operations plan are most vulnerable to disruptions. For instance, one
can analyze which scheduled trips are most frequently changed and which stations
are most frequently affected. This may lead to some surprises, as the effects of dis-
ruptions may be felt much less in the line sections where the disruptions occur than
in the line sections where trains and personnel are removed by service controllers in
order to deal with the disruption.
This directly leads to the issue of robust scheduling. Robustness, as we have discussed
before, is the characteristic of a schedule that allows operations to remain feasible dur-
ing a disruption, and permits easy service recovery. It is clear that the robustness of
a schedule can only be discussed in the context of service control strategies, as it is
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service control that uses the flexibility embedded in a schedule to handle disruptions.
The aim of this thesis is to develop tools to evaluate the robustness of crew schedules,
and such an evaluation can only be performed with a thorough understanding of how
service control works. This can then be applied to provide feedback to planners and
schedulers about how planning and scheduling decisions affect the robustness of a
schedule.
2.6 Literature review
This section presents a review of literature that is relevant to this research. This
is organized into three subjects: simulation, reliability & robustness, and service
recovery.
2.6.1 Simulation
Hoogheimstra and Teunisse [7] describe their research on robustness in timetables in
the Dutch railway network. A program called DONS (Designer Of Network Schedules)
is used to generate timetables, and a DONS-simulator is developed. The simulation
tool enables the authors to study the effect of small disturbances on the punctuality
of trains in the entire network. The simulator can also be used to evaluate how in-
vestments in infrastructure affects.
Middelkoop and Bouwman [12] describe the architecture and features of the simu-
lation program Simone (Simulation Model Network). Simone is a simulation envi-
ronment developed with the purpose of determining the robustness of a timetable
and the stability of a railway network, and thereby improve the quality and stability
of the timetables from a set of different criteria. It does this by determining bot-
tlenecks in the network, by examining the number of delayed departures for all the
stations in the network. Simone can also be used for analyzing delays and exploring
causes and effects of delays for different layouts of railway infrastructures and timeta-
bles. Unlike many simulation models, Simone can simulate an entire railway network.
Simone is used to compare the quality of different timetables. Quality in timetables
depends on network properties such as correspondences between trains and use of
shared capacity. When there are no disturbances all trains run according to schedule.
When disturbances occur Simone inspects the different types of delays (primary and
secondary) and the user gets extensive information on the delays and delay propa-
gation in a specific simulation. This makes it useful for comparing the robustness
and punctuality of different timetables. This is similar to the approach used in this
thesis to evaluate the performance of a schedule, though the key difference is that in
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Simone there is no representation of any crew constraints and crew related service
control interventions.
Sandblad et al. [16] describe various concepts within simulation of train traffic for
use in both planning and training, and the development of a new simulation system
which can contribute to improved methods for train traffic planning, experiments for
developing new systems and training of operators.
The paper presents thorough description of the various uses of simulation as a plan-
ning tool or as a learning tool, e.g. understanding the behaviour of the system, as
a base for difficult decisions, or for controlling the system. In addition the report
describes the different phases in the planning and implementation of a simulation
project. These include problem specification, construction of the model, validation
of the model, programming, verification of the program, planning the experiments,
realization of experiments, evaluation of results and conclusions. The real contribu-
tion of this paper is the thorough treatment of the methodology of simulation, and
its applications.
2.6.2 Reliability and robustness
Carey [1] describes different heuristic measures of stability of a schedule. The reason
for using these measures is that analytical methods are practical only for simple sys-
tems, and simulation methods are time consuming and involved, so in practice the
most widely used measures are heuristic.
The author proposes performance measures which can be used in advance, such as
in the design phase or to estimate the reliability of a proposed schedule. It should
be noted that even though the measures are meant to be used in advance some past
information is needed to determine the distribution of the occurrence of delays.
Initially the author states a measure of reliability which assumes that no secondary
delays occur (i.e. the slack time absorbs all secondary delays), except secondary de-
lays caused to immediately following trains.
As a second type of measures, the author proposes a number of measures which build
on the expected size of the secondary delays, instead of on the probability of occur-
rence of secondary delays. Furthermore the author proposes some heuristic measures
of reliability which do not use probabilities. These measures are not based on infor-
mation on the previous occurrence of delays and are based on the number, size and
spread of minimum headways.
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While this work represents an interesting treatment of delays, its biggest shortcoming
is the simplified handling of secondary delays. This shortcoming is especially perti-
nent to high-frequency rail lines, such as the Piccadilly Line, where secondary delays
can be even more significant than the primary delays. The purpose of service control
is largely to mitigate the effect of these secondary delays, and this is best captured
through simulation given the complex interactions that take place.
Mattson [11] reviews various methods of deriving causal relationships between disrup-
tions and train delays. The article presents three methods for deriving relationships
for train delays: analytical methods, statistical analysis and simulation approaches.
The focus of the paper is on secondary delays and especially on how the amount
of secondary delays can be related to the amount of primary delays and the capac-
ity utilization. Clearly, higher capacity utilization needs lower buffer times which
causes more unreliability, and the author reviews various theories connecting these
two quantities. The conclusion is that analytical methods and statistical analysis do
not require as much input data or computational effort as simulation models. But
they are mathematically demanding, and depending on the context may provide sig-
nificantly inferior results to simulation. Simulation methods offer the most detailed
representation of a railway system and the various interactions that take place, and
are therefore more reliable when it comes to studying delays.
Klabjan et al. [8] discuss the problem of robust airline crew scheduling in airlines.
The approach taken for evaluating the robustness of a crew schedule is the same as in
this thesis. A simulation tool (SimAir) is used to simulate the operations of an airline
network in the presence of disruptions, including the effects of crew oonstraints and
real-time operations control, and the performance of the schedule is measured.
This approach differs from this thesis in the way disruptions are handled. SimAir uses
the complete distribution of block time (time from door closing to door opening) etc.,
which includes observations from disrupted days, and the simulation draws from these
distributions. In this thesis however, the distributions of running time (equivalent to
block time) are drawn from undisrupted conditions, and disruptions are specifically
super-imposed by the simulator. This approach has the advantage of being able to
simulate any kind of disruption. The types of recovery strategies used by airlines are
also completely different from those used in a high-frequency rail service.
Chiraphadhanukul and Eggenberg [4] also discuss the evaluation of airline schedule
robustness. This paper discusses the merits and demerits of a priori methods (i.e.
methods that examine the structure of the schedule analytically) versus simulation
based methods. They also provide a useful discussion of the effects of different kinds
of performance measures and data sources on the measurement of robustness.
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2.6.3 Service recovery
Goodman and Takagi [6] discuss the problem of dynamic rescheduling of trains fol-
lowing a disruption. The paper reviews some of the applications of computers to the
problem of recovering from disturbances. When recovering from disruptions different
criteria are considered; regaining the scheduled departures as quickly as possible, aim-
ing for regular headways or maximizing capacity utilization. The authors recognize
that different types of networks (such as metro or inter-city) need different recov-
ery strategies, and suggest that for metro systems the recovery strategy of regaining
regular headways is often more effective than regaining the original schedule. Two ap-
proaches to recovery are discussed: One where a known set of rules is used to recover
when disturbances occur, or performing service interventions based on developing an
objective function and a search procedure and iteratively finding the optimal recovery
strategy.
Finally, they also discuss the differences between computer and human controlled re-
covery processes. The paper ends with a literature review on scheduling and recovery
strategies.
Puong and Wilson[13] describe the development of, and experiments with, a train
holding model. The goal of using the model is to limit the negative impacts smaller
disturbances have on a train network. The holding model in the article is formulated
as a Mixed Integer Problem (MIP). The objective in the model is to minimize the
total passenger waiting time at stations and the extra passenger riding time due to
a train holding. The objective function is minimized with respect to constraints on
track capacity behind and ahead of the blockage, minimum safe headways, maximum
deviation from schedule and queuing situations. The MIP is solved with a two-step
procedure, starting with finding a worst case but feasible solution and then improving
this solution. This two-step technique makes the execution time fast enough to solve
problems in real time.
The authors discuss how the developed holding model can be used if larger disruptions
occur, and also how to model short-turning. They conclude that buffer time at end
stations and even headways have a positive effect in the reduction of secondary delays.
Carrel [2] presents a comprehensive description of service control and recovery strate-
gies for high-frequency rail lines using the London Underground's Central Line as an
example. The author discusses the different types of interventions, and what drives
their use. There is also an excellent discussion of the environment in which service
control decisions are made and the different types of objectives that compete during
service recovery. This work also devotes substantial attention to the effect of crew
constraints on service recovery.
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2.6.4 Conclusion
While there has been substantial research on reliability and robustness in recent
years, much of it focuses on the robustness of the timetable, and not so much the
crew schedule. There is very little literature on what makes a crew schedule robust,
and how the robustness of crew schedules is evaluated. While there is well-developed
literature related to robust crew scheduling for airlines, that is not the case for rail
systems, especially high-frequency rail systems. This thesis will contribute to filling
this gap in the literature.
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Chapter 3
Structural Evaluation of Piccadilly
Line Crew Schedules
Chapter 2 described the service planning process, and one of its outputs - the crew
schedule. In Section 2.3, the process of crew scheduling was discussed, along with
the specific crew scheduling constraints that apply to the Piccadilly Line. The crew
schedule can affect the performance of a system, and Section 2.5 explored the link
between service control and robust crew scheduling.
In this chapter, the structure of the Piccadilly Line's crew schedules is analyzed,
keeping in mind the ultimate objective of evaluating its robustness. The elements
of the crew schedule that affect its robustness are identified, and the link between
these elements and the performance of the schedule is established. This link is further
explored in Chapter 5, when the robustness of different crew schedules is tested by
simulating them under different operating conditions.
Section 3.1 qualitatively describes the overall structure of three different documents
- the crew schedule, the train & duty analysis, and the crew roster. These three
documents together provide a comprehensive overview of the assignment of crews to
trains. Section 3.2 delves deeper into the crew schedule by identifying the elements
of the crew schedule that affect robustness, and comparing the distribution of these
elements across two different crew schedules - schedule 48 (operated in 2012) and
schedule 49 (operated in 2013). This comparison gives the reader a sense of how two
crew schedules that serve very similar timetables can still have very different struc-
tures.
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3.1 Data sources
In this section, we look at three different sources of information: the crew schedule,
the train & duty analysis and the crew roster. While the specifics of this discussion
are based on the Piccadilly Line, the overall structure of these documents is similar
across many transit systems.
3.1.1 The crew schedule
The Piccadilly Line crew schedule is specified separately for each of its crew bases:
Acton Town and Arnos Grove. It is also specified separately for Weekdays, Saturdays
and Sundays. All the discussion in this chapter is based on the weekday schedule,
though it is equally applicable to the other two days also. Figure 3-1 is an excerpt
from the 2012 Acton Town weekday crew schedule, and it is used to illustrate the
way a duty is specified.
IDutyl Report At INtiTraini From I To I Finish At I Duty I
INa. ]Time I Place I I No. ITime I Place ITime I Place ITime I Place ILnqth'i
1427 107:021 ACT I 1 243 107:191ACT E 101:12 IAGR I I I I
I I I 1 1 245 100:221AGR (10:49 IACT E 111:251 ACT I I
I 112:051 ACT I I2E7 112:111ACT W 112:22 1ACT E I I I I
I I I I 1 354 112:451ACT W 114:24 IACT E 114:411 ACT 107:081
Figure 3-1: A sample duty from the Acton Town weekday crew schedule
This is a single duty, to be performed by a driver. We note the following details about
this duty: The duty starts at 07:03 and ends at 14:41. It consists of two distinct spells:
the first spell starts at 07:03 and ends at 11:35, and is 4:32 long. The second spell
begins at 12:05 and ends at 14:41, and is 2:36 long. The duty itself is 7:08 long which
is within the eight hour limit. The first spell has 3:19 of driving time, and the second
spell has 2:00 of driving time. Both of these are within the 4:15 limit on continuous
driving time.
The two spells are separated by a thirty minute meal break. This is the standard
time allotted for a meal break. Not every duty has two spells - many duties have
just a single spell of work (see Figure 3-2 for example), though they still have a meal
break at the end of the spell. The overall length of the duty excluding the meal break
must be less than eight hours, and the driver may not be scheduled to drive a train
for more than four hours and fifteen minutes in any spell.
Notice that the duty starts at 07:03, but the first train run starts at 07:19. This
sixteen minute gap ensures that the driver has enough time to check-in at the crew
base, and then walk to the platform. There is a gap between the two runs within a
spell. This slack time is a buffer against delays, so that even if the first train is a
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|Dutyl Report At INt|Traini From I To I Finish At I Dutyl CICI
INo. |Time I Place I I No. ITime I Place |Time I Place |Time I Place ILngthl I I
1039 107:061 AGR I 1 245 107:251AGR 10:56AGR W 111:091 AR I I I I
S I I | 1111:391 AR 104:031 1 1
Figure 3-2: An example of a single-spell duty
little late, the driver would not miss the second train.
There is also a large gap of forty six minutes between when the driver gets off train
345, and when the spell officially ends. Some part of this goes towards the time re-
quired to walk from the platform to the crew base (four minutes in the case of Acton
Town). The majority of the time is a buffer or margin against late running, to ensure
that even if the train is late, the driver has enough time to have the thirty minute
meal break and get onto the next train on time. In this thesis, this buffer time is
referred to as meal break slack time. There is very little slack time after the meal
break a driver usually has just enough time to walk to the platform. There is also
some slack time at the end of the duty, i.e. between the time a driver gets off the
last train and when the spell ends. This is referred to as EoD (End of Duty) slack time.
This particular duty begins and ends at Acton Town. Most duties start and end at
one of Acton Town or Arnos Grove. There are also some duties that begin at the
depots (Cockfosters and Northfields) rather than the crew bases. This is the case
when the first train run in that duty is a pull-out from a depot, and such a duty is
said to have a "remote book-on". As mentioned in Section 2.3.2, there is a limit on
the maximum number of drivers who are allowed to book-on remotely. For duties
where the driver books on at the crew base and needs to travel to the depot to pick
the train up, or conversely, where the driver stables a train at the depot, and needs
to travel back to the crew base to sign out, sufficient travel time is provided. If the
drivers cannot use other Piccadilly Line trains to travel to/from the depot (as is the
case with the very early and late duties), a special staff taxi is provided to transport
the drivers. In the case of the duty in Figure 3-1, the meal break also takes place at
the driver's home base, Acton Town. While this is preferred and fairly common, it is
not always the case.
Let us now turn our attention to the train runs in the duty shown in Figure 3-1. While
this duty has two spells and two train assignments per spell, this is fairly uncommon.
Most duties have only one train assignment per spell, though both single-spell and
double-spell duties are common (see Figure 3-3 for example). For each train assign-
ment, there is a start time and place, and an end time and place, and these are tied
to the underlying timetable. Except for depot moves, all train runs start and end at
the two crew bases, i.e. crew changes do not take place at the termini of the line.
In addition to just denoting the start/end location of the run, the direction is also
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specified (ACT E, ACT W, AGR E, AGR W, AGR). This tells us the direction of the
train when the relief takes place, and this plays an important role in determining the
robustness of the schedule. When the relief location is specified simply as AGR with-
out any directional modifier (E or W), it means that the train reverses at Arnos Grove.
IDuty| Report At INt|Trainl From I To I Finish At I Dutyl CICI
1No. |Time I Place I I No. ITime I Place [Time I Place |Time I Place lLngthl I I
1074 114:221 AR I 1 275 114:42|AR E 117:121ACT E 117:351 ACT I I I I
| 119:051 ACT I | 251 112:111ACT W 120:211CFS DTE 120:571 AR 106:041 I |
Figure 3-3: An example of a typical two-spell, two run duty.
It should also be noted that not all duties start and end in the same day. There are
overnight duties that start in the night and end the following morning (see Figure 3-4
for example). These duties are necessary because some depot pull-outs and pull-ins
are too early/late to be performed by normal daytime duties.
IDutyl Report At INt|Traini From I To I Finish At I Dutyl OlCI|No. |Time I Place I I No. ITime I Place ITime I Place |Time I Place lLngthl I I
1511 121:401 ACT I I 262 121:56|ACT E 101:121NFD DTW 102:251 NED DTI I I I
I 102:551 NED DTI I TO DUTY MANAGER'S INSTRUCTIONS I I I I I I| 1 | I I 246 105:09INFD DTW 105:25|ACT E 105:221 ACT 107:221 1 1
Figure 3-4: An example of a night duty
In addition to daytime duties and overnight duties, the third important class of duties
is cover duties or spares. These duties do not have any train assignments, though
they do have a start and an end time, and a crew base. The drivers assigned to cover
duties act as spare drivers and wait in the crew base. They are used as required to
cover for casual absenteeism, sickness, and in the case of disruptions, to cover for
drivers who miss their reliefs or have hit their parameters. See Figure 3-5 for an
example.
IDutyl Report At INt|Train From I To I Finish At I Dutyl OICI|No. ITime I Place I I No. |Time I Place |Time I Place |Time I Place |Lngthl I I
1511 121:401 ACT 1 1 262 121:561ACT E 101:12|NED DTW 102:251 NFD DTI I I I| 102:551 NED DT I 1TO I0TY MANAGER'S INSTRUCTIONS I I I I I I
I I I | | 246 105:091NED DTW 105:251ACT E 105:221 ACT 107:221 1 |
Figure 3-5: Some of the cover duties scheduled at Acton Town
3.1.2 The train and duty analysis (TDA)
The TDA, as it is commonly known in the London Underground, provides the same
information as the crew schedule, but from the train's perspective. It lists every trip
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that a train is scheduled to make, as well the duty that each trip is assigned to. At
crew change locations, it also describes what the outgoing driver does next and what
the incoming driver did previously. While there is no new information in the TDA,
it is a very useful way of visualizing the information present in the crew schedule.
Figure 3-6 shows the TDA for Train 343.
3.1.3 The crew roster
The roster links duties together to form weekly rotations for drivers. Figure 3-7 shows
an excerpt from the Acton Town roster.
Note that rotas 1 and 2 are assigned to leave cover. These are intended to cover
drivers' annual vacation leave. The remaining rotas define the weekly driver assign-
ment. Rota 3, for instance, shows what duties that driver will be performing. The
policy for the assignment of drivers to specific rotas depends on each crew base,
and may depend on seniority. Note that the roster also mentions the total number of
hours per week and per fortnight for each rota. This is important because the average
weekly duty length across the roster cannot exceed thirty-six hours, and a particular
rota cannot exceed thirty nine hours. There are similar rules for the fortnightly duty
length also. As alluded to in Section 2.3.2, Acton Town has only a single roster for
the entire crew base, whereas Arnos Grove has six rosters for six different times of
the day (Dead Early, Late Early, Inside Early, Inside Late, Early Late and Dead Late).
This concludes our qualitative description of the structure of the crew schedule. In the
next section, we break the crew schedule down to individual elements, and compare
these elements across two different crew schedules.
3.2 Comparing the structure of two crew sched-
ules
We begin the comparison of crew schedules 48 (2012) and 49 (2013) by first looking
at some overall statistics which are presented in Table 3.1. The underlying timetable
was modified only slightly between the two duty schedules. In the 2013 timetable,
trains no longer reverse at Ruislip during peak hours, and running times in general
have been refined to better reflect actual performance. This is reflected in a decrease
in the total driving time.
Total driving time and average duty length are only calculated for regular duties
(excludes overnight duties, cover duties, spare days on the rota). Also, the average
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T R A I N A N D D U T Y A N A L Y S I S
D A Y -MONDAYS TO FRIDAYS
PICCADILLY LINE
ISERVICE: IDUTY SCHEDULE No. I OPERATIONAL FROM: ]Train
I WITT 47 1 P10/026 IMon 12/12/10 1
I I IVI CREWI I NEXT 1
I DUTY 1 FROM I TO I I I CHIANGE I R/F I---------
I I lAI TIME I ITRAINITIME I PLACE I
I 
----------------------
I 105 18 AGR SG 105 20 AGR II I I 1
05 26 AGR I Oe17 ACTW II I I
1 10I ACT W I06 41 HRF I I I I I I
1 106 47 HRF 107 19 ACT E I 107 19 IR 1252 408 17ACT E I
I----------------------------------------~---- 
- ---------- I
1 427 107 20 ACT E 100 12 AGR I 108 12 1 {245 I08 22AGR I
---------------------------------------------------------------------- I
1 421 1Off train 270 due 08 02 at AGR I I I I I I I
I 108 19 AGR I09 12 ACT W II I I I I I
I 109 14 ACT W 109 41 HRV W II I I I I I
1 109 56 RV E 110 26 ACT E I 11026 IR 1210 11 22ACT E I
I---------------------------------------------------------------~------- I
I 27 1Off relief after train 221 due 08 50 at NFD DE I I I
10 27 ACT E 11 20 AGR E II I I I I I
111 20 AGR E I11 22 CFS II I I I I I
I Ill 29 CFS 111 48 AGR W |11 48 I 1352 412 07IAGR I
I---------------------------~--------------------------- I
I 32 1Off relief after train 325 due 10 42 at AGR W I I I I
I I11 49 AGR W 12 40 ACT W
112 40 ACT W 113 09 HRV W
I 112 24 HRV E 112 51 ACT E
112 52 ACT E 114 45 AGR E
1 114 46 AGR E 114 55 CFS II I I I I I
I 115 02 CFS 115 21 AGR W 1115 11 IF I I I I
-------- 
- ---------- - -  I
I 79 115 12 AGR W 116 02 ACT W II I I I I I
I I16 05 ACT W 116 20 HRF II I I I I I
116 28 HRF 117 08 ACTE I I I
117 08 ACT E 118 02 AGR E
I 118 04 AGR E 118 12 CFS II I I I I
I Il 19 CFS 118 29 AGR I 118 29 IR 4356 119 411AGR I
I ----- ---------- ------------------- 
- --- -------- I
I 67 IOff relief after train 222 due 7 22 at AGR W I I I I
1 118 29 AGR W 119 24ACTW II I I I I I
I 119 25 ACT W 1195OlF I I I I I I I
S 119 56 HRF 120 26 ACT E I I I I I I I
I 120 27 ACT E 121 201CRE I I I I I I I
S 1I21 22 AGR E I 21 23 CFS I I I I I I I
I 121 41 CFS 121 50 AGR W I 421 50 IF I I I I
I ----------------------------------------------- 
------------ I
1 104 IOff relief after train 250 due 20 42 at AGR WI I I I
I 121 51 AGR W 122 441AW I I I I I I I
1 122 46 ACT W 12 09fF I I I I I I I
1 122 17 HRF 123 46 ACT E I I I I I
I 122 47 ACT E 100 42 AGR E I I I I I
1 100 42 AGR E 100 51 CFS II I I I 1 I
Figure 3-6: A sample TDA
Schedule Schedule 48 Schedule 49
Total number of duties (ALL duties) 308 310
- Reporting at ACP 152 154
- Reporting at AGR 156 156
Total driving time 1953h 54m 1928h 24m
Average duty length 6h 47m 6h 45m
Table 3.1: Overall statistics for the two crew schedules
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Sheet No.: P11\043 Rota Start: Sun 11/12/11 Permanent
Link: MNLNK Location: Acton Town
Remarks: PERMANENT ROTA WTT 48
+----------------------------------------------~------------- 
---
I Rota | Sun Mon | Tue I Wed Thu | Fri Sat Week | Fort. I
Wk no. I | Total | Total I
*----------------------------------+---+--------- --- --------- 4-
01 | ** Leave Cover A AA
------------------------------------- +---+--------- --- --------
00 | **Leave Cover B
I| 73H37 I
-------- ----------------------+ -+ -- ---  ------------
103 | R 492 1 544 | 490 R 1 509 | 4C2 I
17:12 I 16:42 | 6:22 t 19:44 i 15:43 I
J 1:18 1 1:12 i 00:52 i 9 01:0 0 | :13
S7117H46 I C8H'0 | 08H00 |4H54 | 0800 3EH40
-------- ------------------------+ -- -- - - -------------
234 1 451 45e 1 458 1 463 i 534 1 R R
14:14 12:35 I 12:35 13:26 12:33 | |
| 21:52 19:43 | 19:43 I 21:19 19:51 | |
| 07H811 06H38 | EH38 1 07H23 1 07H18 I I 35HC'5 71H45 I
+-------- --------------------+---+---+---+--------- 
--- ---------
05 | R R I 443 447 1 44 447 | 503 | |
7:53 08:33 i 08:4C | :33 | 8:46
14:41 I :41 1 16:25 _1:41 | 17 16 |
6HI | 7H3 2 0711H9 37H38 | 0EH0  36H43 | 71H48 I
---------------------- 6--------------+---+--------- --- ---------
Figure 3-7: An excerpt from the Acton Town roster
duty length does not include the thirty minute meal break time, but includes walking
time.
3.2.1 Relief directions
One of the major objectives while creating crew schedule 49 was to increase the
number of reliefs in the direction preferred by service controllers, i.e. AGR-EB and
ACT-WB. The majority of the reliefs were in the preferred direction in duty schedules
prior to schedule 47. The fixed link constraint at AGR that was first introduced in
schedule 47 resulted in fewer reliefs in the preferred direction. That has been reversed
in schedule 49. Table 3.2 summarizes some key information about relief directions
and types.
Note that AGR-EB and ACP-WB are the preferred relief directions. When the train
is scheduled to reverse at AGR, the relief is denoted as just AGR without any di-
rectional suffix. These reliefs are functionally equivalent to AGR-EB reliefs because
drivers do not have to go past their relief point, like they do with AGR-WB reliefs.
Ending in depots/sidings refers to those duties which end at AGR/ACP/SHR sidings
or NFD/CFS depots.
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Duty Schedule 48 49
Total number of reliefs 469 463
By DIRECTION
- AGR/AGR-EB/ACT-WB 175 277
- AGR-WB/ACT-EB 212 105
- Ending in depots/sidings 82 81
By TYPE
- End of duty 229 229
- Meal break 202 201
- Intra-spell 38 33
End of duty reliefs by DIRECTION
- AGR/AGR-EB/ACT-WB 58 117
- AGR-WB/ACT-EB 98 45
Meal reliefs by DIRECTION
- AGR/AGR-EB/ACT-WB 89 133
- AGR-WB/ACT-EB 107 57
Table 3.2: Comparison of Relief Directions
It is clear from the table that the scheduling team succeeded in its objective of in-
creasing the number of reliefs in the preferred directions. Another important change
to note is the decrease in the number of intra-spell reliefs from 38 to 33. These reliefs
occur when a driver has more than one train run per in a spell.
3.2.2 Driving time: The 4h 15m parameter
A driver is allowed to drive continuously without a meal break (this can include mul-
tiple trains) for a maximum of four hours and fifteen minutes. Figure 3-8 shows the
histogram of continuous driving time for reliefs where the driving time is over three
and a half hours.
We observe that in duty schedule 48 only 2 duties had a scheduled continuous driving
time of over 4h 5m. In schedule 49, this number has increased to 10, and 4 of these
duties have a driving time of over 4h 10m. These drivers are almost certain to violate
their parameters in the event of even a slight delay. Also, a number of these duties
have larger slack values, which means that the slack cannot be used fully because
doing so would violate the driver's parameters. It must be noted that while in theory
60
aCO
C
:5
CV
0
C.
410 - 415
4:05 - 4:10
4:00 - 405
3:55 - 400
3:50 - 3:55
3:45 - 3:50
3:40 - 3:45
3:35 - 340
330 - 335
0
10
6
8
8
.49
w48
13
19
19
21
22
5 10 15 20 25
Figure 3-8: Distribution of driving time in the two crew schedules
drivers are entitled to stop their trains if they violate their parameters, the reality
is different. Most drivers are usually cooperative as long as they know that service
controllers are actively trying to put them back on time.
This increase in driving times was necessary to achieve the objective of improving the
relief direction mix in schedule 49. It is with trade-offs such as this that simulation
comes in handy. It is not immediately obvious if this is a good trade-off to make, and
simulation would allow such a trade-off to be evaluated without actually putting in
into operation.
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3.2.3 Meal reliefs
Meal reliefs are very important to analyse because they represent a potential missed
connection. When a train arrives late for a meal relief, not only is the incoming driver
late, the incoming driver has to drive another train after the meal break, and could
potentially be late for that pickup.
In this context, the meal break slack is defined as the lesser of: (i) the time between
when an operator gets off the train and when the meal break officially starts, less
walking time; and (ii) the time required for the driver to hit the 4h15m driving time
parameter. The meal break slack allows an operator to be late for a relief, and yet not
miss the next train, while ensuring that the 4h15m driving parameter is not violated.
It should be noted that in the majority (close to 95%) of cases, it is criterion (i) that
is binding, i.e. drivers are far more likely to be late for their next train than violate
their 4h15m parameter. The exceptions are duties with exceptionally high driving
times as highlighted in the previous section. Therefore, it is necessary to view meal
break slacks in the context of train lateness at the relief location at that time. Figures
3-9-3-12 show the meal break slack for every relief at each relief location/direction.
The 95th percentile of train lateness at that location at that time of day is superim-
posed on this.
The X-axis represents the time when the operator is scheduled to get off the train.
The lateness at each location was calculated from the March-May 2012 NetMIS data
for that location. The day is divided into 15 minute intervals, and for reliefs that
are scheduled in each 15-minute interval a distribution of lateness is constructed, and
the 95th percentile of this distribution is used. There are a number of sharp kinks
in the lateness graphs because of the poor quality of the NetMIS data. Table 3.3
summarizes some key statistics about the meal break slacks:
48 49
Average meal break slack (minutes) 20 18
Min. meal break slack (minutes)
- Considering the 4h15m parameter 5 1
- Not considering the 4h15m parameter 11 5
Table 3.3: Comparison of Meal break Slack time
It is interesting to see that both the minimum and average slack times have decreased.
This is partly the result of having low slacks when lateness is low, and high slacks
when lateness is high, rather than set a uniform minimum for the whole day. But
there are still some reliefs that are below the 95th percentile of lateness, such as the
evening time reliefs at ACP-EB or late morning reliefs at AGR-EB. The simulation
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Figure 3-9: Meal break slack vs Lateness at ACT-EB
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model would enable us to find "critical" reliefs which are missed more often than
others.
It is interesting to note that there are many duties with very high slack times of
more than thirty minutes. That much of slack time is unlikely to be used as service
controllers would not let a train arrive 30 minutes late merely because the driver has
enough slack time; they actively work to put trains back on time. Therefore, a crew
schedule that had a tighter distribution of slack time with the same average slack
time but a higher minimum (and consequently, a lower maximum) slack time would
potentially be more robust. Again, if such a hypothetical crew schedule were created,
its performance could be tested through simulation.
3.2.4 Intermediate reliefs
This refers to reliefs that happen in between a spell that has two train runs. A ma-
jority of these are step-backs at AGR, which are not traditionally considered reliefs.
However, every step-back represents a potential missed connection in that a driver
may arrive late at AGR while the train that he/she is scheduled to step back into is
on time. This is especially possible on the Piccadilly Line if there is a delay on one
of the branches which only delays trains from that branch.
There is a slack time associated with these reliefs which is simply defined as the time
between the arrival of the incoming train and the departure of the following train.
This does not account for the minimal amount of walking that may be required (such
as between platforms). Table 3.4 summarizes some key information about intermedi-
ate reliefs:
48 49
Total number of intermediate reliefs 38 33
Average slack (minutes) 15 17
- Step backs (minutes) 10 10
- Other intermediate reliefs (minute) 25 25
Minimum slack (minutes) 8 9
Table 3.4: Comparison of intermediate reliefs
The number of intermediate reliefs has decreased which leads to simpler operations. It
is notable that the average slack time for step-backs is ten minutes, which is essentially
the time between successive AGR-reversing trains. In contrast, other intermediate
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slacks have an average slack of twenty five minutes.
3.2.5 End of Duty (EoD) reliefs
This refers to reliefs where the driver finishes his duty after being relieved from his
train. EoD reliefs are different from meal reliefs for a number of reasons. Firstly,
the issue of a driver being late for the next train does not arise in the case of EoD
reliefs, so driver lateness is less of an issue. The more important issue here is potential
driver refusal to go past, say AGR-EB, to CFS and back to AGR-WB for an EoD
relief when the train is running 20 minutes late. This is in fact the primary reason
for preferring AGR-EB and ACT-WB reliefs, and this is modelled in the simulation.
Secondly, there are two parameters to be concerned with here: the 4hl5m driving
time parameter, and the 8h duty length (excluding meal break) parameter.
Therefore, the EoD slack is defined as the minimum of: (i) the late running margin
(i.e. the time between the relief and end of duty, less travel/walking time, stabling
time, check off time etc.) and (ii) the time needed to hit the closer of the 4h15m driv-
ing time or 8h duty length parameter. Table 3.5 summarizes some key information
about EoD reliefs:
48 49
Total number of EoD reliefs 229 229
Average slack (minutes) 7 8
Reliefs with unusable slack 50 43
Table 3.5: Comparison of EoD reliefs
Both the average and minimum slacks are far lower for EoD reliefs compared to meal
relief which makes sense given the difference in their impacts on reliability. In fact
there are a number of EoD reliefs with no slack time at all.
Figure 3-13 shows the amount of late running margin that EoD reliefs have versus the
amount of time required to hit a parameter. There are reliefs where the late running
margin at the end of the duty might not be used fully because a driver might hit one
of their parameters before being able to use the margin fully. Such duties represent
potentially wasted slack, and their number has decreased from 50 in schedule 48 to
43 in schedule 49. They constitute the duties below the dark line in figure 3-13.
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Figure 3-13: EoD Late running margin vs. Time to hit a parameter
3.2.6 Duty length
Figure 3-14 shows the cumulative distribution of duty lengths in the two crew sched-
ules. The two schedules have very similar distributions of duty length. What is
interesting, however, is the fact that close to 40% of the duties have a duty length
less than seven hours, with many duties that are just a little over four hours long,
when in fact the maximum permissible duty length is eight hours (excluding a thirty
minute meal break). The mean duty length is about six hours and forty five minutes.
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The reason for this varied distribution is two-fold:
Firstly, there is a thirty six hour limit on the weekly driving time for a driver, which
over a five day week, translates to an average of seven hours and twelve minutes. As
many drivers do not prefer to work on weekends, the schedulers deliberately have
longer than average duties on weekends so that fewer drivers are scheduled on week-
ends. Therefore, the average weekday duty length is less than 7h 12m, and is in fact
equal to 6h 45m.
Secondly, Section 2.3.2 mentioned the fixed-link constraint at Arnos Grove which di-
vided the day into six periods. Each period has its own roster, and each of these
rosters has to maintain an average weekly duty length of thirty six hours. The prob-
lem with this is that, if the scheduling software were left to its own devices, very
early duties and very late duties would be shorter than other duties. But because
of the fixed-link constraint, these duties also have to have the same average length
as other duties. The scheduler achieves this by forcing other duties to be short, and
making these early/late duties longer by padding them with extra slack time. This is
one of the reasons for this varied distribution of duty length. Another side-effect of
this fixed-link constraint is that slack time is often allocated to duties to make them
longer, when that slack time could be more usefully deployed elsewhere.
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Figure 3-14: Cumulative distribution of duty lengths
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3.2.7 Conclusion
This first part of the chapter qualitatively described the crew schedule and the roster.
The second part of the chapter delved deeper into the crew schedule, by looking at
individual elements of the crew schedule that impact robustness and comparing the
distribution of those elements across two different crew schedules.
Some of these elements include cover duties, relief mix, slack time, number of two-run
spells and continuous driving time. Given finite resources it is not possible to make
improvements in every one of these areas. In moving from schedule 48 to 49, there
was an overarching goal to improve the mix of relief directions. At the same time,
the number of two-run spells also decreased, which should be good for robustness.
However, the tradeoff was a slight increase in the number of long duties and a slight
decrease in the average amount of slack time.
It is not possible to say if this tradeoff is good or bad, or if the change should have
been more or less drastic, by merely looking at the structure of the crew schedule as
we have in this chapter. This is because there are a number of complex interactions
that come together to determine the performance of a schedule and it is not possible
to capture all of these interactions by merely looking at the structure of the schedule
as we have done here. This is the primary motivation for the simulation approach
that is described in the next chapter.
Using simulation, it is possible to evaluate these, and other hypothetical tradeoffs and
identify best practices in scheduling. In chapter 5, the simulation approach is used to
perform a comparative evaluation of the performance of the same two crew schedules
(48 and 49), and in doing so, we will refer to many of the structural elements (such
as slack time, relief directions etc.) that were highlighted in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Simulation-based Framework for
Evaluating Crew Schedules
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter attempted to evaluate the robustness of a crew schedule by
analyzing its structure. There are various characteristics of the crew schedule that
make it robust, for instance, the presence of slack time and spare operators. However,
there are also other characteristics whose effect on robustness is less clear. For in-
stance, most rail transit lines have a number of locations where crew reliefs may take
place. While it is generally acknowledged that it is necessary to have a mix of various
kinds of reliefs both kinds of reliefs for operational flexibility, it is not clear what the
optimal mix of reliefs is. Even in cases where the robustness benefits are obvious,
such as the addition of slack time and spare operators, the utility of the additional
resources is unknown. For instance, it is possible that adding two duties will result in
a significant increase in reliability, whereas subsequent additions will have decreasing
marginal returns.
The primary problem with this structural approach to evaluating robustness is the
difficulty in relating the elements of the crew schedule to the actual performance that
is observed under disrupted conditions. While it is possible to make general state-
ments such as "more slack is better" it is much harder to isolate the impact of a
specific element of robustness by just looking at the structure of the crew schedule,
because of the inter-dependence of the different elements defining the crew schedule.
For instance, it is possible that a particular relief has very little slack time associated
with it. But that relief may offer many options for substitution, and therefore, if
that train is late arriving for that relief, it can easily be renumbered. The different
elements of the crew schedule such as slack, relief location, relief time and spare op-
erator availability interact with the actions of service controllers in the context of
commonly observed disruptions to produce the performance that is observed over a
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period of time. Therefore, it is difficult to isolate the effect of an element of the crew
schedule just by examining the structural differences between different crew schedules.
Secondly, even if we were able to completely identify the elements that have positive
and negative impacts on the performance of the crew schedule, it is difficult to quan-
tify their impact. However, some kind of quantification is needed for taking decisions
on whether to increase or decrease manpower, or whether to negotiate labour agree-
ments. In order to make these kinds of decisions, it is necessary to predict the impact
of those changes on the performance. Similarly, if it were possible to predict the
impact of varying certain elements of the crew schedule, say relief directions, then it
would be possible to generate and evaluate multiple crew schedules with minor varia-
tions of those elements and thereby identify best practices for robust crew scheduling.
Simulation is a commonly used tool to build predictive models because it naturally
captures interactions, it can easily use empirical/observed data, and it is adaptable.
Depending on the level of detail of the simulation, it can capture many levels of inter-
action. Simulation models store the state of every object in the system, and capture
the reactions of each object to the state of the system, which includes every other
object. Vehicular micro-simulation models, for instance, capture the physical interac-
tion between vehicles that are close to one another. TSM (London Underground Ltd.,
2006) is an example of a micro-simulation model that is employed by the London Un-
derground to analyse the capacity of their underground lines by performing detailed
simulations of train movements (including acceleration and deceleration), loads and
dwell times at stations. It is also possible to build models that simulate disruptions
and recovery strategies. While it may be possible to write analytical expressions that
capture some of these effects, it is difficult to retain mathematical tractability while
also capturing detail.
Simulation models go hand in hand with data-driven analysis. They allow the use
of large datasets directly without questionable assumptions on their distributions,
unlike analytical models which are based on theoretical distributions. Most modern
transit systems use some combination of AVL (Automatic Vehicle Location or train
tracking), AFC (Automatic Fare Collection) and APC (Automatic Passenger Count)
data which provide an excellent source of disaggregate data in large amounts. It
may be difficult to fit these data to theoretical distributions with reasonable good-
ness of fit. With simulation, however, empirical distributions can be based directly
on observations, and they can take on any shape. The tradeoff with using empirical
distributions is greater difficulty in interpreting the results and the need for larger
sample sizes. It is generally easier to identify the cause of changes with analytical
models; this is more difficult with arbitrary distributions and with simulation. More-
over, a large sample size should be used to build empirical distributions if the model
is to capture the effects of low-probability events.
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Adaptability refers to the relative ease with which we can make changes to the model.
For instance, we may wish to test different service recovery strategies. Doing so is
easier with a simulation model than an analytical model because the behavior of the
simulation can be defined in modules. For instance, there may be a module for re-
covery in the absence of decision-support systems, and another for recovery in the
presence of decision-support systems, and we can choose which module to use in a
particular simulation experiment. There is no dependent analytical expression that
loses validity in response to which recovery strategy is in place.
Clearly, simulation is a powerful tool. However, there is a need to balance complexity
with necessity. While developing a simulation model, it is necessary to keep in mind
the ultimate purpose of the model, and capture a level of detail that is sufficient for
that purpose. It is necessary to remember the cliche that a model must be made as
simple as necessary (or as complex as necessary), but no more. For instance, a model
for the pedestrian flow in a busy transit interchange station might find it necessary to
simulate the movement of individuals, but the same might be unnecessary for a simu-
lation of the capacity of the transit lines at that station. The more complex a model,
the more difficult it is to calibrate, validate, and the longer it takes to run. There-
fore, the level of detail of a simulation model must be tailored to the problem at hand.
The rest of the chapter describes a simulation model of the daily operations of a
high-frequency rail transit line that is used to evaluate the robustness of the line's
crew schedule. While the model has been developed with the London Underground
in mind, and specifically the Piccadilly Line, it has consciously been developed in
a manner that allows it to be adapted to other contexts. Section 4.2 discusses the
general framework that is used for the simulation-based evaluation of a schedule.
Section 4.3 describes the details of the simulation model, including the methods,
inputs and outputs. The evaluation framework and simulation model are general and
can be applied to any rail transit service. Section 4.4 details the implementation of
the model for the Piccadilly Line, and discusses the running time models, dwell time
models and service control strategies for the Piccadilly Line.
4.2 Framework for simulation-based evaluation of
robustness
This section introduces the basic framework for the simulation-based evaluation of the
robustness of a crew schedule. Qualitatively, robustness is the resilience of a schedule
to disruptions - the ability to maintain operational feasibility in the event of minor
incidents, and the ability to recover easily from major incidents. The approach that is
taken to measure the robustness of a schedule, is to simulate the operations of the line
with that schedule under different kinds of operating conditions (normal, and varying
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degrees of disruption), and to measure the performance under those conditions.
The simulation model simulates a day's operations of the transit line given the route
structure, operating plan (timetable and crew schedule), observed running time and
dwell time distributions, and service control strategies. The above elements comprise
the "normal" operating conditions of the line. In addition, the model also allows the
simulation of incidents, the consequent disruption, and the operations under those
disrupted conditions.
During the course of a schedule's life (typically a year at the London Underground),
it is operated under a wide range of conditions. There will be days when nothing
goes wrong and the operations plan is closely followed, days when there are minor
incidents (such as a passenger emergency alarm or a defective train) that cause slight
deviations from the operations plan, and yet other days when severe incidents (such
as a signal or track failure, or a fatal accident) causes widespread disruption.
Therefore, the crew schedule must also be simulated under a variety of conditions
that are representative of real operating conditions in order to evaluate its robust-
ness. But in doing so it is necessary to exercise some judgment about the severity of
the disruptions that we wish to simulate. While it is no doubt good if a schedule is re-
silient to even the gravest of incidents, such a schedule would be needlessly expensive
to operate, because it would have to incorporate massive amounts of slack resources
to achieve that level of resilience. Therefore, a schedule can only be designed to be
resilient to a certain range of incidents and in evaluating its robustness, it is sufficient
to simulate that range.
Therefore, the approach that is taken in this thesis is to simulate the operations of
the transit line for a reasonable range of incidents, and we discuss later what that
means. Each run of the simulation gives us the performance of the line for that day
under those specific conditions. After having simulated the entire range of operating
conditions, we have performance measures for multiple days of operations, with each
day representing a specific operating condition. These daily performance measures
are then aggregated to evaluate the performance of the crew schedule over the full
range of reasonable disruptions, which is ultimately a measure of robustness. Figure
4-1 presents this framework graphically.
It is clear that it is possible to evaluate the performance of not just an existing crew
schedule, but a hypothetical crew schedule that, say, relaxes a key labour constraint.
That would allow the user to predict the impact of that change by examining the per-
formance of the new crew schedule compared with the baseline case. It would also be
possible to create multiple different crew schedules with, for instance, varying mixes
of relief directions to try and find the best combination. Similar exercises in system-
74
'I
Performance of the crew schedule over all
days, i.e. over the full range of reasonable
disruptions
Figure 4-1: Framework for simulation-based evaluation of robustness
atically varying other elements of the crew schedule would allow the identification of
best practices in robust crew scheduling.
4.3 Simulation architecture
This section introduces the framework for the simulation and describes the inputs,
methods and outputs of the simulation. While the simulation model was developed
with the Piccadilly Line as the intended application, the framework is presented in
more general terms which allows it to also be applied to other transit lines. Occa-
sionally, examples taken from the Piccadilly Line are used to illustrate finer details,
or to state principles in a less abstract and more concrete fashion.
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Timetable & Crew Schedule
Running time & Dwell time distributions
Service control strategies
Distribution of incidents
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4.3.1 Simulation inputs
The following are the inputs to the simulation listed in Figure 4-1:
* Route structure: The route structure is a collection of locations that are con-
nected to one other in a certain way. It is the network on which the simulation
takes place, i.e. trains only move between the locations identified in the route
structure. The route structure can simply be the network of the transit line
being studied, or it could be simplified. For example, as will be explained later,
the route structure of the Piccadilly Line that is used in the simulation is a
simplification of the actual network where only crew bases and termini are in-
cluded. While simplifying the route structure care must be taken to ensure that
all train movements can be represented, and all important details are captured.
* Timetable: The timetable describes the movement of trains or rolling stock
over the route. For each train, it lays out the locations where it is expected to
travel and the time when it is expected to be at that location.
" Crew schedule: It is an assignment of drivers to trains that ensures that
every train movement is manned by a driver. It is subject to crew constraints
as described in section 2.x.
" Running time & dwell time distributions: A running time distribution is
specified for each segment, i.e. for every pair of adjacent locations in the route
structure. The running time distribution models the variability in the running
time of trains, in the absence of disruptions. This variability is caused by a
number of factors: each driver drives differently, even the same driver does not
always drive in exactly the same manner, and trains sometimes hit amber or
red signals which slow or stop the train temporarily. If the segment in question
has stations within it, then the running time also includes the dwell times at
those intermediate stations, which clearly have their own variability.
Dwell time distributions are specified for each station in the route structure.
They describe the dwell time for the train whenever it arrives at a location in
the route structure. Please note that the route structure may not contain all
the stations in the real network (as is the case with the model in this thesis),
in which case the dwell time at stations that are not explicitly included in the
route structure would be incorporated into the running times of the segments
of which they are a part. Dwell times vary due to a number of factors such as
varying passenger alightings and boardings, driver differences etc.
These distributions can be analytical or empirical, univariate or multivariate or
conditional on some system state variable. Because of the availability of large
amounts of AVL data at most modern transit agencies, these distributions can
be easily estimated.
" Service control strategies: As seen above, there is clearly variability in the
movement of trains. This variability might be the result of normal processes,
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or due to incidents, which lead to disruptions. Hence, the operations plan as
laid out by the timetable and the crew schedule is not always followed. In
such cases, it sometimes becomes necessary for the controller to intervene in
real-time and override the operations plan in order to meet some passenger
objectives (such as headway control) or crew objectives or constraints (such as
reducing driver lateness to avoid parameter violations). It is also possible that
the deviation from the operations plan will result in operational infeasibility.
For instance, a driver who is on a train that is 20 minutes late might be required
to pick up another train, and might not be able to make it to that pickup on
time. In such cases, real-time intervention is necessary to maintain operational
feasibility. These real-time interventions are effected by service controllers who
act to meet those objectives and constraints. A simulation of train movements,
especially during disrupted conditions, must necessarily include control actions,
and this is implemented in the form of service control strategies which are clearly
defined rules that take into account the current system state, and modify the
operations plan in a manner that ensures feasibility while meeting any passenger
or operational objectives.
e Range of incidents: This describes the distributions of incidents that are to be
simulated. For the purpose of this simulator, an incident is defined as an event
that stops train movements at a location, at a certain time, and for a certain
duration. Section 4.2 contained a brief discussion of the types of incidents
that are to be simulated, and this will be followed up in Chapter 5. For those
incidents that are to be simulated, it is necessary to know the distributions
of their frequency, location, time of occurrence and duration. This model will
allow more than one incident may take place per day or replication.
Section 4.4 discusses how the inputs were obtained for the specific case of the Pic-
cadilly Line.
4.3.2 Simulation methodology
The previous section explained the inputs needed by the simulation. In this section,
the simulation methodology is examined. Figure 4-2 presents this simulation method-
ology in the form of a flowchart.
Preprocessing
As explained in the discussion about the route structure in the previous section, the
route structure may contain only a subset of all stations on the line. In that case,
it is necessary to extract the information that is relevant to the route structure from
the timetable and the crew schedule. In other words, trains now move between the
locations on the route structure, and not the original locations on the line, and the
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Preprocessing:
- Adjust timetable and crew schedule to conform to the route structure
- Create an initial set of events corresponding to the projected arrival of every train at a
location in the route structure (after pulling out of the depot/siding) and add these
events to a queue
SimlaingTrIM v n
simulatinq Train Movemet
While the heap of is not empty, extract & process the topmost event
Event Type
Event Heap
(ordered by Event time)
SW Projected Arrival
BE
-E Projected Departure
Actual Departure
Performance Measurement:
- Calculate performance measures such as headways, train lateness, trip cancellatins,
short-tumns, spare operator ubtlzation etc.
Actual Arrival
Figure 4-2: Simulation Methodology
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timetable and crew schedule must reflect this reality. If the route structure is chosen
judiciously, this should not result in a loss of correctness or detail.
The simulation is event-driven, and as shown in Figure 4-2 there are four types of
events: Projected Arrival, Actual Arrival, Projected Departure and Actual Departure.
These events are now discussed in detail.
Projected Arrival Event
This event is created at the time of departure of a train from a station, and cor-
responds to the projected time of arrival of that train at its next station. A train
may not actually arrive at the station at the projected time of arrival for a number
of reasons. The platform(s) that the train is supposed to use may be occupied and
there may be other trains in queue to use that (those) platform(s). Or the projected
arrival time may be too close to the departure time of the previous train from that
platform, resulting in a violation of the minimum time separation requirements be-
tween trains. These occurrences cannot be predicted when the train departs from the
previous station, and therefore, a distinction is made between the projected arrival
and the actual arrival of a train at a station. Figure 4-3 describes the handling of a
Projected Arrival event.
When processing a Projected Arrival event, the first step is to check if the platform(s)
that can be used by that train is (are) available. To perform this check, an arrival
queue is maintained. Trains are entered in this queue in chronological order of their
original projected arrival time at that station. Therefore, the arrival queue represents
the order in which trains queue up in the approach to the station.
In the case of a simple through station with only one platform for available for through
movement in each direction, each platform has one arrival queue. In the case of a
terminus with multiple platforms where trains reverse, it would make sense to main-
tain a single arrival queue for all the platforms. This is because trains waiting for a
platform outside a terminus are normally assigned to the first platform that becomes
available. In the case of a station where two branches merge, the choice of arrival
queue configuration depends on how the merger occurs. If the merger occurs before
the station, and the merged lines use a common set of platforms (as is the case with
Acton Town, for instance), we would maintain a common arrival queue for trains
from both branches. On the other hand, if the merger happens after the station,
and both branches have their own dedicated platforms, then separate arrival queues
would have to be maintained for the two branches.
In this simulation, the trains in the arrival queue are processed in a first-come-first-
serve basis, though this does not always have to be the case. For instance, in the case
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Processing a Projected Arrival type Event
Projected Arrival
Is the target platform(s) free?
YES
The train actually arrives at the
station at the projected time.
Create ACTUAL ARRIVAL event
NO
The train does not actually arrive at
the station at the projected time
Calculate new projected arrival
time based on station arrival queue
Create PROJECTED ARRIVAL event
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Add event to heap
Figure 4-3: Processing a Projected Arrival event
of a station such as Acton Town where two branches merger just before the station,
it is possible that one branch is accorded higher priority over the other.
The arrival queue is used to determine if the target platform(s) is available. If it is
available, then the train is said to actually arrive at the projected arrival time. There-
fore, an Actual Arrival event is created for that train with the projected arrival time
being the event time, and this event is added to the event queue to be processed next.
If the platform(s) is (are) not available, then the train does not arrive at the projected
arrival time. In that case, a new projected arrival time is estimated, and a new
Projected Arrival event is created for the train. To calculate the new projected
arrival time the following procedure is employed:
" Examine the arrival queue.
* If there are no trains ahead of this train that have not yet arrived, then the new
projected arrival time is estimated as the departure time of the last train plus
the minimum separation hmin of sixty seconds.
" If there are trains ahead of this train in the arrival queue that have not yet
arrived, then the new projected arrival time is estimated as the projected arrival
time of the last such train plus the minimum separation hmin of sixty seconds.
This is a conservative estimate of the projected arrival time in that the actual
arrival can never take place before this.
Actual Arrival Event
This event corresponds to the Actual Arrival of a train at a station. Figure 4-4 de-
scribes the steps involved in processing this type of event.
First, the trains is removed from the station arrival queue. The operations plan is
used to decide where (i.e. which of the adjacent stations on the inputted route struc-
ture) the train will go to next, and which driver will operate the train. The operations
plan could either be the scheduled operations plan, or one that has been modified in
real-time by the service control logic. The train's next location could be the depot in
case the train is being stabled.
The departure time function is used to determine the projected departure time of the
train. This function, which is described later in this section, determines the departure
time based on factors such as the dwell time distribution at that station, the type of
move (reversing or through) and the occurrence of an incident at that station. Cor-
responding to the estimated departure time, a Projected Departure event is created
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Processing an Actual Arrival type Event
i t Actual Arrival
Remove train from
station arrival queue
Determine Next Location
Determine Projected
Departure Time
Current Operations Plan
(as modified by service control)
Departure Time Function
(depends on dwell times, type of
move: through or reversing, incidents)
Create PROJECTED
DEPARTURE event
and add to heap
Add train to
station departure queue
Figure 4-4: Processing an Actual Arrival event
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for that train and added to the event queue.
Projected Departure Event
This type of event is spawned by an Actual Arrival event at a station. A train may
not be able to depart at the projected departure time because the projected departure
time may be too close to the departure of the previous train, violating the minimum
separation requirement. Figure 4-5 describes the steps involved in processing a Pro-
jected Departure event.
The first step is to check if the train is able to depart at the projected departure time.
To perform this check, we maintain a departure queue for every platform (or set of
platforms, in case multiple platforms feed into the same track, as in the case of a
terminus). This departure queue represents demands from trains to depart from that
platform(s). Trains are ordered in the departure queue on the basis of their original
projected departure times, and are served in a first-come-first-served basis.
A train is able to depart from the station at the projected departure time if there
are no trains ahead of that train in the departure queue, and if the previous train to
depart departed atleast sixty seconds (hmin) ago. In that case, an Actual Departure
event is created corresponding to the projected departure time, and is added to the
event queue to be processed next.
If the train is unable to depart at the projected time, an updated departure time
is estimated, and a corresponding Projected Departure event is created. The new
projected departure time is estimated as follows:
" If there are no trains ahead of this train in the departure queue, then the
new projected departure time is estimated as the actual departure time of the
previous train plus the minimum separation (hmin) of sixty seconds.
" If there are trains ahead of this train in the departure queue, then the new
projected departure time is estimated as the projected departure time of the
last such train plus the minimum separation (hmin) of sixty seconds.
Actual Departure event
This event corresponds to the actual departure of a train from a station. Figure 4-6
describes the steps involved in processing this type of event.
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Processing a Projected Departure type Event
Pr ,ojected Departure
Is the train able to depart?
(iLe. have there been no other departures in that
direction in the last h,.C seconds?)
YES
The train actually departs from the
station at the projected time.
ICreate ACTUAL DEPARTURE event I
NO
The train does not actually depart
from the station at the projected time
Calculate the new projected
departure time based on the
station departure queue
Create PROJECTED DEPARTURE event
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Add event to heap
Figure 4-5: Processing a Projected Departure event
Processing an Actual Departure type Event
Actual Departure
Remove train from
station departure queue
Determine Projected Arrival
Time at next station k-F Arrival Time Function(depends on running times, incidents)
Create PROJECTED
ARRIVAL event
and add to heap
Add train to next
station arrival queue
Figure 4-6: Processing an Actual Departure event
85
The first step is to remove the train from the station departure queue. The train's
next location has already been determined while processing the train's arrival at that
station. The projected arrival time at the next station is calculated using the Arrival
Time function, which will be described later in the section. This function calculates
the arrival time at the next station, given the departure time from the previous
station based on the distribution of running times between the two stations and the
presence of disruptions. A Projected Arrival event is then created corresponding to
the projected arrival time of this train at the next station, and this event is added to
the event queue.
Processing events
The four types of events used in this simulation have been described. Events are
stored in a queue chronologically and processed accordingly. At the start of the sim-
ulation, a Projected Arrival event is added for each train corresponding to its first
arrival at a station in the route. A Projected Arrival event spawns an Actual Arrival
event, which spawns a Projected Departure event and in turn an Actual Departure
event. When a train arrives at its last station for the day, no more events are created
for that train. The event queue is processed till it is empty, at which point every
train has been stabled, and the operations end.
This way, an entire day's operations are simulated from its start (around 5am in the
case of the Piccadilly Line) to its close (at around 1.30am on the following day in
the case of the Piccadilly Line). We do not have to deal with the issue of specifying
boundary conditions. All trains start and end at the depots, and all drivers start and
end their duties at their crew bases.
4.3.3 Departure time function
The departure time function is called whenever an event (i.e train arrival) is being
processed and it determines when the projected departure time of the train from that
station. The departure time function clearly depends on the distribution of dwell
times for that location as well as the type of location. A location could either be a
through-station, or a terminus (i.e. reversing point) or a depot.
Clearly, the departure time function will be very different for each of these locations.
For a through station, the dwell time is determined by passenger alightings and board-
ings (which vary by time of day). At a terminus or reversing location, the departure
time might depend on the train's lateness. A train with lateness greater than the
recovery time might not be held beyond the minimum reversing time, whereas a train
that is not as late might be held till its scheduled departure time, or held to fulfill
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some headway requirement. The departure time from a depot is usually the scheduled
departure time.
Furthermore, it is possible that an incident occurs when the train is at the station
and this causes a delay in the train's departure. In that case, the departure time
function needs to account for this additional delay. The structure of the departure
time function is discussed below, in the absence and presence of an incident. Section
4.4.3 contains more details on dwell time models for the Piccadilly Line.
In the absence of an incident
The projected departure time from a through station in the absence of an incident is
taken to be:
PDT = AAT + DwT (4.1)
where PDT is the projected departure time from that station, AAT is the actual
arrival time at that station, DwT is a realization from the dwell time distribution for
that station for that time of day.
The projected departure time for a reversing station in the absence of an incident is
taken to be:
PDT = max AAT + RevTmin (4.2)
SDT
where, RevTmin is the minimum reversing time at that station, and SDT is the
scheduled departure time. This ensures that the train does not depart before its
scheduled departure time.
In the presence of an incident
When an incident occurs at a through station, it is assumed that the projected depar-
ture time is pushed back by an amount of time equal to the duration of the incident.
Therefore the projected departure time is calculated as:
PDT = AAT + DwT + INCIDENTDURATION (4.3)
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In the case of a reversing station, the expression used is:
PDT = max {AAT + RevTmin + INCIDENT-DURATION (4.4)SDT
Therefore, the incident may or may not cause a delay in the projected departure time.
If the train is ready to leave before the scheduled departure time, even after accounting
for the incident and the time taken to reverse, then the projected departure time is
equal to the scheduled departure time. Otherwise, the train is projected to leave as
soon as it is ready to leave.
4.3.4 Arrival time function
The arrival time function clearly depends on the running time distributions for that
segment. It needs to ensure that trains do not overtake each other, and in fact,
maintain a minimum separation between each other. The running time distributions
that are inputted account for the normal variability in running time. In addition, the
arrival time function also accounts for any additional running time due to incidents.
The arrival time function is first discussed for undisrupted conditions and then for
disrupted conditions.
Undisrupted conditions
The simplest form of the arrival function would be to simply draw a value of the run-
ning time from the running time distribution for that segment and for that departure
time, and to add that running time to the departure time. Expressed mathemati-
cally:
AT" = DTa" + (RTab|DTa")
where ATb" is the arrival time of train n at location b, DTa is the departure time
of train n at location a, and (RTabIDTa) is a sample from the running distribution
of segment ab, conditional on the departure time DTa from a. However, there are
two important shortcomings of this model: (i) it does not ensure that a minimum
separation is maintained between successive trains - in fact, it does not even prevent
overtaking, and (ii) it does not capture any correlation between the running times of
successive trains. The first point is clearly an issue. The second point may or may not
be an issue depending on the context. In the case of a high-frequency rail service such
as the Piccadilly Line, there is likely to be significant interaction between successive
trains as shown below.
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Figure 4-7: Scatter plot of running times of successive trains (ACT-AGR)
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Figure 4-7 is a scatter plot showing the running times of pairs of successive trains be-
tween ACT and AGR. The Y-axis denotes the lead train, and the X-axis denotes the
following train, and the red line is the OLS line. It is clear that the two are strongly
correlated, and indeed this is borne out by a correlation coefficient of 0.829. This
is expected for two reasons: (i) successive trains have the same or similar scheduled
running times, and (ii) when a train is delayed/early, the train behind it tends to
respond in a similar fashion. Indeed, the second observation is confirmed by Figure
4-8 which is a scatter plot showing the schedule runtime deviations (in seconds) of
pairs of successive trains between ACT and AGR. Once again, the Y-axis denotes the
leading train, and the X-axis denotes the following train, and the red line is the OLS
line. The correlation in this case is 0.735.
Therefore, when we draw from the distribution of running time, we should not make
independent draws. Rather, we need to generate the sample in such a way that this
correlation is captured. The following procedure is employed to generated correlated
random variables:
" Let RTab(n - 1) be the realized running time of the train n - 1 that precedes
train n on the current segment ab. We need to determine RTab(n) in a way that
reflects the correlation between the running times of the two trains.
" Let (RTabIDTa) be a random draw from the running time distribution of seg-
ment a, conditional on the departure time DTa of train n from a.
e Set RTab(nh) = pabRTa(l1)± 1- - pib (RTabjDTa), where Pab is the correlation
between the running times of successive trains on segment ab.
The above procedure ensures that generated running times of successive trains are
correlated as desired. The simplicity of the procedure stems from the assumption
that the random variable has a normal distribution. This assumption is not strictly
true in the case of running times, because the distribution in asymmetric. However,
for the sake of mathematical simplicity we make this assumption.
To ensure that a minimum time separation is maintained between successive trains,
we force the arrival time of a train to be greater than or equal to the arrival time of
the preceding train, plus the minimum separation hmin of sixty seconds. Expressed
mathematically:
f DT" + RTa(n)
AT = max A (4.5)
Ab"- + mhin
where RTab(n) is calculated using the procedure described above. This formulation
solves both of the drawbacks mentioned at the beginning the section.
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Disrupted conditions
This refers to the case when an incident that specifically hinders train movement is
introduced into the simulation. This introduces a delay in addition to the variability
in running time that has been modelled previously. For the purpose of this simulation,
an incident is defined as an event that occurs at a certain location and direction on the
line at a certain time, and has the effect of preventing the movement of trains through
that location in the disrupted direction for a certain duration of time. To model the
effect of disruptions on train movements, we make the following assumptions:
" It is possible to unambiguously identify the train, say n, that is directly affected
by the incident, i.e. all the trains ahead of this train are unaffected by the
incident. This assumption may not always reflect what happens in practice
as trains that escaped the incident might still be deliberately held by service
control to reduce the gap in from the of the disrupted train.
" The arrival time of this train ATb" at the next location b (i.e. the end point of
its current segment) is simply taken to be the current estimated arrival time,
plus the duration of the incident. Therefore, when inputing the distribution
of incidents it is necessary to understand that the duration of the incident is
understood to be the duration for which train movement is disallowed. Again
this assumption does not perfectly reflect reality because the disrupted train
is likely to experience greater than average dwell times because of the gap in
service. For the same reason, it is also less likely to be slowed by red or amber
signals, and therefore might have shorter than average running times.
Under disrupted conditions, the arrival times of some of the trains right behind the
disrupted train will be defined by the second expression in equation 4.5. In other
words, as the disruption is cleared and the trains resume movement, the trains keep
arriving (for some time) one after another separated by just the minimum headway
hmin. This makes intuitive sense and is also what is observed.
Figure 4-9 shows the waterfall diagram during an incident that occurred on the cen-
tral section of the Piccadilly Line at around 6PM on 10 October 2012. The red oval
shows the train that was affected by the disruption, i.e. the train either suffered the
disruption directly (as in the case of a passenger alarm), or was just behind the dis-
ruption (as in the case of a faulty signal). This train remained stationary for nearly
20 minutes. The trains ahead of this train are unaffected by the disruption. The
trains behind this train are closely bunched together. Once movement resumes, the
trains arrive one after another separated by just the minimum headway, as shows
by the black oval. It is possible to model the minimum headway hmin as a random
variable with a distribution, say, between 60 and 90 seconds, to model the variability
involved. But this variable is difficult to estimate, and this variation is quite small in
comparison to the end-to-end running times on the line.
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4.3.5 Service control
The operations plan dictates the movements of trains and crew in a system. While
the operations plan represents the ideal target state of the system, it is not always
possible to stick to the operations plan due to routine variability and unexpected
incidents. This can be a very serious issue, especially in the context of a precise
high-frequency operations such as the Piccadilly Line, where any blockage of train
movement can result in an immediate pile-up of trains. Depending on the severity
of the disruption, trains may be running late, running out of order or not running at
all. Consequently, the drivers operating those trains would also be unable to adhere
to their crew schedule, and might be late for reliefs or changeovers. Therefore there
is a need for active service control to ensure that train lateness is kept in check, and
drivers are at the right place at the right time.
Service control interventions change the operating plan and these actions can take
place at any time. Therefore, every time an event is processed, the service controller
function is called. This function examines the current state of the system and makes
changes to the operating plan based on the service control strategies that are pro-
grammed. The simulation model assumes that the appropriate crews are present at
the right time and place to operate the service as per the operations plan. It is the
responsibility of the service control logic to maintain the feasibility of the operations
plan by making real-time changes to the operations plan as necessary, in accordance
with the inputted service control strategies.
Section 2.3 provided a general introduction to service control - what it is, why it is
needed, the types of interventions that are possible, and the overall strategy behind
service control. Section 4.4.5 describes the specific service control policies that are
implemented in the simulation model of the Piccadilly Line.
4.3.6 Simulation output: Performance evaluation
The outcome of one replication of the simulation is a set of observations on train
and crew movements from which it is possible to calculate daily performance mea-
sures. These measures could be operations focused measures (measuring train or
crew performance) or customer focused measures. For instance, it is possible to cal-
culate the distribution of simulated running times for each segment, train lateness at
crew change locations, percentage of scheduled kilometers operated, number of spare
drivers used, headway variance, headway proxy etc. These performance measures are
aggregated over many replications and are used both to validate the simulation, and
to evaluate the robustness of the crew schedule.
If we were to simulate the performance of the system given the same incident (and
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holding all other inputs also constant), i.e. if we were to run two replications of the
simulation with the same incident, the performance measures are almost certainly go-
ing to be different. This is because the running times and dwell times are randomly
drawn from distributions, and each realization of these random variables is likely to
be different. Therefore, even for a given day with a given incident, it is advisable
to run the simulation multiple times to increase the sample size of observations from
which the performance measures are calculated.
4.4 Simulation model of the Piccadilly Line
One of the advantages of the simulation technique is the ability to use the large
amounts of automated data that transit agencies generate to estimate the distribution
of parameters empirically rather than trying to fit them to a theoretical distribution.
The simulation framework described in section 4.2 requires the following inputs: route
structure, timetable, crew schedule, running time distributions, dwell time distribu-
tions, service control policies and incident distributions. In this section, we discuss
the specifics of the first six inputs in the context of the Piccadilly Line. Incident
distributions are discussed in Chapter 5 along with the validation and application of
the model.
4.4.1 Route structure
The route structure defines the basic geometry of the line. It is the collection of
locations at which train and crew movements are modeled. An obvious choice of
route structure for the Piccadilly Line is to use the real network with all 53 stations.
However, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose of this simulation is to
model train and crew movements so as to evaluate the robustness of crew schedules.
The arrival and departure times at intermediate stations are not as important as
the arrival and departure times at the crew change locations. Therefore, the route
structure that is used in the simulation consists of only the crew change locations
and termini. That gives us sufficient detail to model train movements, while allowing
us to concentrate on the crew change locations. Figure 4-10 shows the reduced route
structure of the Piccadilly Line that is used in the simulation.
Acton Town and Arnos Grove are the crew bases. Cockfosters, Uxbridge, Rayner's
Lane and the two Heathrow terminals are the termini, i.e. the locations where trains
reverse. Arnos Grove also doubles as a terminus. This network does not include the
depots or any of the intermediate stations. Because all the termini are included, the
end-points of the trips in the model are the same as the end-points of trips in reality.
Also, the inclusion of crew change locations in the route structure ensures that a
crew change does not happen in the middle of a segment. A limitation of this route
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Figure 4-10: Reduced route structure of the Piccadilly Line used in the simulation
structure is that it does not include other reversing locations that are used to turn
trains around during emergencies (such as Hammersmith, King's Cross etc.) As we
shall see later, this is not a serious limitation given the range of operating conditions
that we are being tested here. Moreover, this can easily be incorporated into a future
version of the model.
An incidental advantage of this model is that we need running time models for only
6 segments and dwell time models for only 7 stations, as opposed to running time
models for 52 segments and dwell time models for 53 stations. The running times
are also likely to be more accurate because having more long segments usually results
in smaller errors than many short segments, because in the latter case the error is
compounded more times. The disadvantage is that interaction between successive
trains will not be modeled as accurately as in a micro-simulation.
4.4.2 Running time models
The arrival time function calculates the arrival time of a train at its next location
given its departure time from its previous location and the state of the system at the
time of departure. The arrival time function uses the running time distribution which
is one of the input parameters to the simulation. The arrival time function itself is
described in section 4.3.4. In this section, we discuss the running time distributions
for the Piccadilly Line.
The running time can be derived in multiple ways: it is possible to construct a de-
tailed micro-simulation model for each segment, it is possible to construct analytical
expressions that predict running time based on system state variables (such as re-
gression equations), or it is possible to estimate empirical distributions of segment
running time based on AVL data and draw from that distribution. The latter ap-
proach is used here because it is simpler than performing a micro-simulation, while
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also being data-driven and capturing more variability than an analytical expression.
Clearly, running times vary by time-of-day because dwell times at intermediate sta-
tions will be higher during the peak. Furthermore, there are more trains operating at
peak times and there is a greater chance that a train's movement is hindered by the
train preceding it. Unlike buses where overtaking is possible, trains generally cannot
overtake each other. Therefore, the arrival times of successive trains are not inde-
pendent. And finally, there is no question that running times will look very different
during a disruption. For all these reasons, it is not appropriate to just construct a
distribution of running times and draw from it. We need to take a more nuanced
view of running times.
As noted in section 4.3.1 the distribution of running times that the simulation needs
are the running times in undisrupted conditions. To estimate undisrupted running
time distributions, a panel of days with "excellent performance" were selected. These
are eight days in 2012 (September 19, 25, 26 and October 2, 4, 18, 24, 29) which have
Headway proxy scores greater than 98.5%. The headway proxy score is generated
for every LU line at the end of a day's operations, and is a measure of how many
headways were within acceptable limits. The Piccadilly Line has a target headway
score of 97%, and any day with a score greater than 98% is considered to have had
excellent performance. Furthermore, none of these days had any major incidents,
based on the service manager's comments.
Having selected a panel of days without disruptions, the NetMIS (AVL) dataset for
those days and for the stations in the reduced network is examined. The NetMIS
dataset for each location (and direction - eastbound or westbound) has an entry
for every train arrival/departure event at that station in that direction. Each entry
records the train number, trip number, arrival time, and departure time. However,
the NetMIS dataset for the Piccadilly Line is far from perfect and there are many
entries that are missing or have junk values. For every location, NetMIS entries with
incomplete or junk entries for any of the fields (arrival and departure time, train
number or trip number) are excluded, which leaves around 80% of the entries.
We start off by looking at the distribution of running times from ACT (Acton Town)
to AGR (Arnos Grove) eastbound. Since every NetMIS entry corresponds to an ar-
rival/departure event at a station, it is necessary to associate the departure event
of a train at ACT with the corresponding arrival event at AGR. This matching is
done using the train and trip numbers. The actual running time of that train is then
calculated as the difference between the arrival time at AGR and the departure time
at ACT. Performing this calculation on all the NetMIS entries from the selected panel
of eight days gives us 2,031 data points for running time between ACT and AGR.
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Figure 4-11: Histogram of running times from Acton Town to Arnos Grove
Figure 4-11 shows a histogram of the running times on those eight days from ACT
to AGR. The minimum running time is about 48 minutes, and most of them are less
than one hour. The mode of the distribution is 53 minutes, and the average is 53.5
minutes. 95% of the runtimes lie between 50 and 58 minutes.
Figure 4-12 shows the variation in running time between ACT and AGR by time of
day. The X-axis is departure time from ACT. The left Y-axis shows running time and
the right Y-axis shows the standard deviation of the running time. Each red point
is one observation from the panel of eight days. The black line shows the average
running time for each thirty minute period (i.e. 5:45-6:15, 6:15-6:45, ... , 21:45-22:15),
and the green line shows the standard deviation of running time for each thirty minute
period. The blue line shows the scheduled running time for every trip.
We observe that:
" There is a significant scatter of observed running time (red points) around
the scheduled running time (blue line) which shows the inherent variability
in running time that is observed even on "good" days. This scatter is not
symmetrical about the scheduled running time (blue line), nor is it consistent
through the day.
" The average observed running time (black line) follows the same trends as the
scheduled running time (blue line ). However, the deviation from the schedule
is not the same through the day. For instance, the lines are much closer during
the mid-day period (11:00-14:00) than in the evening peak.
" The variability in the running time which is measured by the standard deviation
of observed running times (green line) also shows significant variation through
the day.
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Given these observations, it might be possible to postulate an analytical expression
for the running times. But one of the advantages of simulation and the fact that we
have large amounts of AVL data is the ability to use empirical distributions, and that
is the approach that is used here. During the simulation, the following procedure is
followed to make a random draw from the running time distribution of a particular
segment for a particular thirty minute period:
" Using a random number generator, draw from a uniform [0,1] random variable.
Let the drawn value be x.
" The value of y = F- 1 (x) needs to be calculated, where F is the CDF (cumulative
density function) of the running time distribution under consideration.
" Let the running time distribution have N observations which are arranged in
increasing order. Then the nth observation (n = 1, 2, ..., N) has a percentile
of (n - 1)/(N - 1). The smallest observation is at the Oth percentile, and the
largest value is at 100 percentile.
" If x is directly equal to one of the N percentile values calculated above, then y
is equal to the corresponding value of running time.
" If x falls between two percentile values, say xi and x2, then let y1 and Y2 be the
running time values corresponding to x1 and X2. Then we calculate the value
of y by linearly interpolating between the two values. Mathematically,
y2 - X1y = y+ (x - zi) *Y2-W
Therefore, the running time distribution for a segment is composed of a set of or-
dered observations for every thirty minute period. This process is repeated for every
segment, for both directions.
4.4.3 Dwell time models
The dwell time model determines how long a train stops at a location to unload and
load passengers, and as such it is only relevant for through stations, namely Arnos
Grove, Acton Town and Rayner's Lane. At the termini, Cockfosters, Uxbridge, the
Heathrow terminals (and Arnos Grove, for trains that reverse there), the departure
time is determined by how long it takes the driver to reverse the train, and not the
dwell time. The one exception to this rule is the case of a reversal at Arnos Grove
which involves a step-back, as the driver does not have to reverse the train himself.
Therefore, the dwell time model is only developed for these three locations.
Dwell time is clearly a function of time-of-day, and we expect higher than average
dwell times during peak hours. However, apriori, this effect is not expected to be
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Figure 4-13: Scatter plot of dwell times at Acton Town eastbound
pronounced given that none of the three stations being modeled are among the most
crowded stations on the Piccadilly Line. Figure 4-13 is a scatter plot of dwell times
at Acton Town eastbound. We observe that there is a pretty wide spread of dwell
times, from a minimum of 8 seconds to a maximum of 3 minutes and 59 seconds. The
average dwell time, however, is only 22 seconds. It is also quite clear that there is no
correlation with the time-of-day.
The dwell time at Acton Town and Arnos Grove might also depend on whether a
crew change is involved. From talking to the DRMs (Duty Reliability Manager) who
regularly ride in the train cabs, I gathered that the dwell time was not impacted by
a crew change as long as the entering driver was ready and waiting on the platform.
For the purpose of this simulation, it is ensured that the service controller always
maintains operational feasibility, including providing sufficient walking time for the
drivers to reach their trains. It is also assumed in the simulation that drivers follow
the instructions given to them, and therefore the ONA (Operator Not Available) sce-
nario does not arise. In practices, ONAs do in fact occur, and they can be modeled
as incidents that occur at a crew change location.
It is also important to note that the dwell time at these intermediate stations is quite
small compared to the overall trip journey time. For instance, the average dwell time
at Acton Town (for the panel of good days) is only 22 seconds compared to the jour-
ney from Cockfosters to Uxbridge, which takes around 100 minutes.
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Figure 4-14: Histogram of dwell times at Acton Town eastbound
The dwell time model is estimated for each thirty minue period. A random sample
is drawn using the same method outlined in the previous section on running times.
4.4.4 Station details
In this section, we discuss the geometry of the stations in the simplified route struc-
ture, and the type of arrival and departure queues that are used as a result.
Cockfosters
Cockfosters is a terminus and has three platforms that are used interchangeably.
Therefore the three platforms have a single arrival queue and a single departure
queue. The minimum reversing time at Cockfosters is taken as four minutes, which
is the time required for an operator to walk to the other end of the train.
Arnos Grove
Arnos Grove has trains both going through and reversing. It has three platforms, with
the outer platforms usually used for through services, and the centre platform usually
reserved for reversing trains. Therefore the three platforms have their own arrival
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queues. The eastbound platform has its own departure queue. The center (revers-
ing) platform and the westbound platform share a departure queue. The minimum
reversing time at Arnos Grove is also four minutes in the case of trains where there is
no crew change. For reversals that involve a crew change (i.e. a step-back operation),
the dwell time is drawn from the dwell time distribution because the new driver is
already waiting in position at the other end of the platform, and the dwell time is
determined by how long the passenger alighting and boarding process takes.
Acton Town
Acton Town is not used to reverse trains, but it is unique because the line splits into
two branches west of the station. Acton Town has four platforms, with two platforms
usually reserved for the District Line and two for the Piccadilly Line. The Piccadilly
Line can make use of the District Line platforms, but this usually only happens during
severe disruptions. For this model we assume that the Piccadilly Line exclusively
uses its two platforms. Both the westbound and eastbound platforms have their own
departure and arrival queues. It must be noted that the eastbound arrival queue has
trains from both branches present in it. Both in the case of Arnos Grove and Acton
Town, we implicitly assume that if a crew change is scheduled to take place, the
operator is ready in position to take over the train. ONA (Operator Not Available)
scenarios are not considered.
Rayners Lane
Rayners Lane has trains going through to Uxbridge, and trains reversing. Platform
occupancy may be an issue due to interactions with the Metropolitan line, with which
the track is shared. However, this interaction is not explicitly modeled in this model.
Delays in arriving at Rayner's Lane due to merging with the Metropolitan Line are
partly captured by the running time distribution from Acton Town to Rayner's Lane.
We note that in calculating the departure time of a through train using equation
4.2, DT(n - 1) should represent the departure time of the last train departing from
Rayner's Lane - be it Metropolitan or Piccadilly. But that is beyond the scope of
this simulation. Also, the reversing move at Rayners Lane involves moving from the
westbound platform to a central siding, walking to the rear of the train, and then
moving back to the eastbound platform. Based on discussions with the Piccadilly Line
staff, the minimum reversing time at Rayner's Lane is taken as six minutes.
Uxbridge and Heathrow Terminals
Trains only reverse at these stations. The minimum reversing time for Uxbridge is
assumed to be four minutes because the reversing move is similar to Cockfosters. The
reversing move at Heathrow Terminal 5 is similar to Rayners Lane, and therefore the
minimum reversing time is assumed to be six minutes. Trains do not actually reverse
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at Heathrow Terminal 4 - it is actually a through move. Therefore, the minimum
reversing time is taken as zero minutes.
4.4.5 Service control in the Piccadilly Line
One of the components of the Simulation architecture discussed in Section 4.3 is real-
time service control, whose purpose is to keep the operation feasible and running
smoothly by monitoring the system and making changes to the operations plan as
required. The role of service control was discussed in the general context of simulat-
ing the operations of a rapid transit line in Section 2.3. In this section, the specific
service control policies that are implemented in the simulation of the Piccadilly Line's
operations are discussed.
Service control is as much an art as a science. The nature of the job is such that
there is a need to be able to respond quickly to a wide variety of situations. In the
case of the Piccadilly Line, it was the author's observation, based on four weeks of
close interactions with the control center staff, that there is no fixed rulebook which
lays out clearly defined policies to deal with every kind of disruption. While there
are certainly general guidelines in place, these have been developed in a somewhat
informal manner over many years of experience in dealing with disruptions. The exact
actions that will be taken in dealing with a problem vary from situation to situation,
and from controller to controller.
That being said, there are certainly observable patterns in the way disruptions are
handled. This is especially so in the case of most minor disruptions, where train
lateness is of the order of ten to twenty minutes. In such cases, it was the author's
observation that -service controllers act to reduce train lateness by a combination of
short-tripping and renumbering of trains, and employing spare drivers.
On the other hand, when there are more severe disruptions, the range of control ac-
tions greatly increases. Controllers often cancel many trips and stable trains in an
effort to deal with reduced line capacity. It is also common to see trains short-tripped
at many more locations. Furthermore, the large number of factors that enter the
decision making process during severe disruptions make every disruption unique, and
it is difficult to find generalizable service control policies during severe disruptions.
Furthermore, it is not likely that crew schedules should be expected to be resilient
to major disruptions, as doing so would require the schedules to have large amounts
of slack resources, making them highly inefficient. For these reasons, the Piccadilly
Line crew schedule is only simulated under relatively minor disruptions, which are far
more commonplace, and for which it is possible to lay out structured service control
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rules.
The nature of service control policies make them extremely specific to the geometry
and context of a line. While the interventions that are used, such as short-turning or
expressing, are common to most rail transit systems (as discussed in Section 2.3.2),
the specific combination of interventions that are used in a situation is dependent
on the features of that line, and it is impossible to generalize these service control
strategies to all rail transit lines.
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, crew reliefs act as fixed points in the schedule and
controllers make an effort to ensure that crew reliefs take place as scheduled. In the
case of the Piccadilly Line, crew reliefs are scheduled either at Arnos Grove or Acton
Town, in the eastbound or the westbound directions. In addition, there is a fifth kind
of relief which occurs when a crew relief takes place along with a scheduled reversal
at Arnos Grove. We first discuss some general principles that apply in all of these
cases.
Firstly, a train that is less than ten minutes late does not call for intervention. This is
because nearly every duty in the Piccadilly Line crew schedule has a minimum slack
time of ten minutes, and therefore it is not critical from a driver lateness standpoint
that the train be put back on time. Furthermore, a train that is currently ten minutes
late, might not be ten minutes late when it actually arrives at the crew relief point.
Unless further disruptions occur, there is a good chance that the train can make up
some of its lateness through recovery time at the terminals. And finally, lateness of
less than ten minutes is fairly commonplace even in the absence of any disruption,
and service controllers would be fighting a losing battle if they attempted to put every
single train back on time. It must be noted that this ten minute threshold is not a
strict rule, but more a guideline, which has evolved over many years of operations. A
crew schedule that has significantly lower or higher minimum slack would necessitate
a change in this threshold.
Secondly, it is important that a driver starts his/her run approximately on time, even
though it may not be possible to ensure that a driver finishes his/her run on time.
This is important because if a driver starts a run late, some or all of his/her slack
time will have been consumed at the start of the run itself. This leaves the driver
vulnerable in the event that a further delay is encountered.
Based on these general principles, we discuss the service control rules that have been
implemented in this simulator. It must be noted that these rules do not represent
the optimal service control policies for those situations. They also do not represent
the full spectrum of service control policies that are applied in practice, because it is
not possible to generalize every single action that is taken by a controller. Instead,
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they represent a simplified version of the service control policies that are used on
the Piccadilly Line on a daily basis to deal with everyday lateness and minor dis-
ruptions. Simulating the performance of different crew schedules with these service
control policies and under normal or slightly disrupted conditions will allow us to test
the performance of those crew schedules under the type of operating conditions that
are most commonly observed.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.5, the service control function is invoked every time an
event is processed because service controllers continuously monitor the system and can
make changes at any time. Every time the service control function is invoked, the list
of currently running trains is scanned. Service control interventions are only applied
to trains that are more than ten minutes late and have not yet been reformed. The
exact intervention that is applied depends on where the train is scheduled to have
its next crew change. As discussed previously, there are five possible crew change
locations, and these cases are now discussed.
Acton Town EB/WB reliefs
The most common way of reducing train lateness is to short-trip the train. Trains
heading to Cockfosters are often turned at Arnos Grove because of the low passenger
flow between Arnos Grove and Cockfosters. This can save a train about 20-25 minutes
of time. Trains heading to Uxbridge are often turned at Rayner's Lane because the
Metropolitan line provides service between those two stations. This can save about
25-30 minutes of time. In cases when both interventions are possible, the choice is
made based on the degree of train lateness.
It is uncommon to turn trains heading to Heathrow Airport (especially during minor
disruptions) because of the potentially large negative passenger impacts of doing so.
This action is usually reserved for more serious disruptions, and is not used in this
simulation.
However, the preferred strategy for bringing trains back on time is renumbering. To
understand how it works, consider the following example: train 240 is scheduled to
have a crew change at ACT-WB at 10:00. The train is running 15 minutes late. We
then look to see if there is another crew change that happens at ACT-WB around
10:15. Let us assume that train 241 is scheduled for a crew change at 10:14. Therefore,
the new driver for 241 would be on the platform by 10:14. When train 240 arrives
at 10:15, he/she takes over the train, changes it to 241 and leaves approximately on
time. When train 241 arrives, say at 10:30, the new driver for 240 gets into the train,
changes it to 240 and leaves. He/she is however, departing 30 minutes late. In other
words, the lateness of train 241 has been transferred to train 240, and train 240 needs
to be put back on time. If it is bound for Uxbridge, it can be turned at Rayner's
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Lane. If it is a Heathrow train, it would have to be turned at Northfields, which
is avoided. Instead, the train could be turned in the eastbound direction at Arnos
Grove, if it is scheduled to go all the way to Cockfosters.
Because renumbering causes the lateness of one train to be transferred to another
train, it is used when lateness is in the 10-15 minute range. If the lateness is greater
than that, it makes sense to just turn individual trains around. The advantage with
renumbering is that two trains are put back on time with a single short-turn opera-
tion. The renumbering strategy can be extended to a chain of more than two trains,
and this is done occasionally in practice, though it is difficult to find opportunities to
do so. However, this operation is not implemented in the simulator.
Arnos Grove EB/WB reliefs
The strategy for handling AGR WB/EB reliefs is very similar to ACT WB/EB reliefs.
If a train is less than fifteen minutes late, the possibility of a renumbering operation
is explored by searching for a candidate train for renumbering. The candidate train
must be scheduled to have a crew change at the same location at the projected time
of arrival of this train. Just as it was observed in the ACT case, when a renumbering
operation is performed the combined lateness of the two trains is transferred to a single
train. This train is put back on time by short-turning it at Arnos Grove instead of
traveling all the way to Cockfosters. If renumbering is not possible, or if the train is
more than 15 minutes late, the train is put back on time by short-turning it. Again,
trains going to Heathrow are not turned around at Northfields.
Arnos Grove reversals
The overall strategy is the same as in the previous two cases. The only difference
is that after renumbering, the train cannot be put back on time by short-turning at
Arnos Grove, as the train is already scheduled to be turned at Arnos Grove. There-
fore, the only possibility for putting the train back on time is to turn it at Rayner's
Lane if it is an Uxbridge-bound train. Figure 4-15 shows a flowchart representation
of the above service control policy as it is implemented in the simulation model.
Spare operators
In this simulation, spare operators are used in two cases:
* Despite the service control intervention, an operator may be late getting off
his/her train. If the operator is scheduled to get onto another train after this
(either immediately, or after a meal break), it is possible that the operator is
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If it is a CFS-bound train that
has not yet crossed AGR-EB
If it is an UXB-bound train TuI
that has not yet crossed RLN
Figure 4-15: Service control strategy
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late for that pickup. In that case, a spare operator is deployed in his/her stead.
How often this situation arises would depend on the distribution of slack time
in the crew schedule.
9 Service controllers usually dont actively monitor driver parameters. This is
partly because this information is not presented to them in an easily accessible
manner, and partly because it is difficult to process such large quantities of
information while making a decision. During minor disruptions, drivers are not
very likely to violate their parameters. But when they are in danger of doing
so, the type of relief has a bearing on what happens. It has been observed
that drivers who are on their last run for the day and are scheduled to get off
their trains at AGR-WB, are sometimes unwilling to go past AGR-EB. This is
because they know that they will be late for their relief. In that case, a spare
operator is deployed to operate the round trip from Arnos Grove to Cockfosters
and back. The same thing is observed in the case of ACT-EB reliefs. This is
in fact the reason for the service controllers' dislike of AGR-EB and ACT-WB
reliefs.
A crew schedule that has a higher average slack time, or a higher minimum slack time
would be expected to use fewer spare operators. Similarly, a crew schedule that has
a better alignment between slack time and typical lateness (other things being equal)
would also be expected to use fewer spare operators. Therefore, the number of spare
operators used in place of operators who are late for their pickups is an indicator of
schedule robustness and is directly influenced by the distribution of slack time in the
schedule.
Other things being equal, a schedule that has a better relief mix would use fewer
spare operators. Similarly, a schedule that has a lower value of maximum duty length
and maximum continuous driving time is also likely to result in fewer drivers hit-
ting their parameters. Therefore, the number of spare operators used to cover for
drivers who have hit their parameters is also an indicator of schedule robustness, and
this is influenced by the distribution of relief directions, duty length and driving time.
In practice, the deployment of spare drivers is handled by service controllers and the
duty managers at the crew bases. It is also possible that there are no spare drivers
available when they are needed. For the purpose of this simulation, it is assumed that
there is an unlimited supply of spare operators. Therefore, the utilization of spare
drivers is not representative of real operations. However, when performing a com-
parative analysis of crew schedules, the utilization of spare drivers for two different
crew schedules is definitely an indicator of robustness. Other things being equal, a
crew schedule that has more slack and a better relief mix is likely to use fewer spare
operators.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a framework for a simulation-based evaluation of the robust-
ness of a crew schedule. A simulation model for a general rail transit line was devel-
oped, and the details of this model were examined in depth. Finally, we discussed
the details of implementing this simulation model for the Piccadilly Line, including
the estimation of running time and dwell time models, and service control policies.
The following chapter deals with the validation of this model, and its application
to performing a comparative analysis of the robustness of two Piccadilly Line crew
schedules.
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Chapter 5
Simulation-based evaluation of
Piccadilly Line crew schedules
The previous chapter described a simulation-based framework that can be used to
evaluate the robustness of a crew schedule. Furthermore, a simulation model was
developed for the London Underground's Piccadilly Line which can simulate the per-
formance of the line under a range of operating conditions. In this chapter, this model
is first validated by performing simple sanity checks under undisrupted and disrupted
operating conditions to ensure that the model's output is consistent with what is
observed in reality. The model is then applied to two Piccadilly Line crew schedules
to evaluate and compare their performance under a range of operating conditions.
The comparative evaluation of their simulated performance is viewed in the context
of their structural differences (described in Chapter 3) to develop insights on how to
improve the robustness of Piccadilly Line crew schedules.
5.1 Model validation
The model is validated by performing simple sanity checks to ensure that the results
of the simulation are consistent with what is observed in practice. This is first done
for undisrupted conditions, and then for disrupted conditions.
5.1.1 Undisrupted conditions
The 2012 Piccadilly Line crew schedule (schedule 48) is simulated without any inci-
dents. The simulation model is run for a total of 100 replications, and the results are
averaged to estimate the performance of schedule 48 under undisrupted conditions.
The observed data comes from the panel of eight days with good performance that
were used to estimate the running time and dwell time models for the simulation (see
Section 4.4). The simulation model is applied to Schedule 48 as the observed data
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also comes from Schedule 48.
Figure 5-1 shows the running times of successive trains between Acton Town and
Arnos Grove. The X-axis shows the running time of the leading train, and the Y-
axis, that of the trailing train. Figure 4-7 showed the same scatter plot but using
observed (rather than simulated) running times from undisrupted days. The two
figures are very similar which is expected given that the running times used in the
simulation are drawn from distributions that are constructed using observed running
times.
1:02
:59
0:56
3:353
F2
0:45
G:45 0:50 0:53 C:56 0:59 1:02
Running time of Leading train
Figure 5-1:
undisrupted)
Running times of successive trains between ACT and AGR (Schedule 48,
The correlation between the simulated running times of successive trains is slightly
lower than what is actually observed in Figure 4-7. This can be explained by the fact
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that the simulation uses a simplified network structure where many stations are not
explicitly represented. For instance, there are no stations between Acton Town and
Arnos Grove in the simulation, whereas there are 22 stations in reality. If train move-
ments were explicitly simulated between every one of these stations, there would be a
greater degree of interaction between successive trains which would result in greater
correlation between the running times of successive trains.
Figure 5-2 shows the average lateness of trains arriving at a crew change location (i.e.
ACT-EB, ACT-WB, AGR-EB, AGR-WB or AGR). The average is calculated over
all trains arriving in fifteen minute intervals starting at 7AM and ending at 9PM.
The figure shows that lateness rarely exceeds three minutes (on average). There is a
distinct peak corresponding to the morning peak, and the mid-day period experiences
little lateness. Lateness again increases during the evening peak, and then persists
late into the night. The observed and simulated lateness trends are very similar, as
expected.
Figure 5-3 shows the average headway of trains departing from AGR-EB. The average
is calculated over all trains departing in fifteen minute intervals starting at 7AM and
ending at 9PM. The peaks have a headway of around 2.5 minutes which corresponds
to 24 trains per hour, and the mid-day period has 3-3.5 minute headways which cor-
respond to 18-20 trains per hour. The observed and simulated headways are very
similar, as expected.
In all three cases (running times, train lateness and headways), the simulated outputs
are very similar to the observed outputs, which is expected given that the running time
and dwell time inputs used for the simulation come from the same data. However, this
still serves as a simple check to ensure that the simulation is performing as expected
in undisrupted conditions.
5.1.2 Disrupted conditions
The 2013 crew schedule (schedule 49) is simulated under two different disrupted
conditions: Scenario 1 simulates a disruption in the trunk portion of the Piccadilly
Line and Scenario 2 simulates a disruption in the Rayner's Lane branch.
Scenario 1: Disruption in the trunk
In this scenario, an incident at 10AM, halfway between Arnos Grove and Acton Town
(westbound), that lasts forty minutes is simulated. Therefore, the first train to cross
this point on the line after 10AM has its running time increased by forty minutes,
and the running times of the trains behind it are calculated as described in Section
113
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4.3.4. The delays caused by this incident would normally result in service controllers
intervening in the service in an effort to reduce train lateness. To illustrate the effect
of service control, this scenario is simulated with and without the presence of service
control. In each case, the simulation is repeated 100 times, and the results are then
averaged.
While a forty minute incident is quite severe, it was used for the purpose of vividly
demonstrating the effect of service control, which might not be as evident with a
minor incident. It is not, by any means, a "typical" incident.
Figure 5-4 illustrates the effect of service control on train lateness, and consequently,
driver lateness. The graph above depicts the average train arrival lateness across all
stations in the network, calculated for every fifteen minute interval between 6AM
and 11PM. The graph below depicts the same quantity, but only for trains arriving
at Acton Town westbound. In both cases, the blue line marks train lateness when no
service control actions are taken, i.e. when trains are not put back on time through
renumbering and/or short-tripping. The orange line marks train lateness when the
service control policies described in Section 4.4.5 are applied. The Y-axis in both
cases is trains lateness in minutes.
The presence of the incident is identified by the sudden upsurge in train lateness
shortly after the incident occurred. This increase is first detected at Acton Town
westbound, as it is immediately downstream of the incident. The lateness at ACT-
WB shoots up to forty minutes as soon as the disrupted train arrives there. But the
incident is also reflected, albeit to a lesser extent, in the average lateness across all
stations. It is clear from the figure that the service control has a positive effect in
reducing train lateness. Both when looking at train lateness at ACT-WB and when
looking at train lateness across all stations, the lateness caused by the incident per-
sists for much longer without active service control. This persistent lateness creates
problems for crew changes because drivers may be too late to pick up their next train.
Drivers may also have to be relieved early if the lateness causes their parameters to
be violated. Finally, lateness also causes drivers to end their duties late, essentially
working overtime (though this may not necessarily be compensated). Table 5.1 illus-
trates many of these effects.
Scenario Without SC With SC
Number of short-turns 0 12.8
Number of pickups missed 18 10.6
Number of drivers relieved early 14.5 7.8
Overtime operator-hours 6.5 2.8
Table 5.1: Performance measures for Scenario 1
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In the absence of service control, trains are not short-tripped (short-turned). How-
ever, with active service control, an average of 12.8 trains are short-tripped, either at
Arnos Grove (for trains going to Cockfosters) or at Rayners Lane (for trains going
to Uxbridge). As explained in Section 4.4.5, Heathrow-bound trains are not short-
tripped in this simulation. The effect of all this short-tripping is to reduce train
lateness as illustrated in Figure 5-4. The reduced lateness in the presence of service
control manifests itself in fewer missed pickups, fewer drivers needing to be relieved
early, and fewer overtime hours.
Drivers may miss pickups after their meal breaks, or in the case of spells with more
than one train run, within a spell. In the case of a meal break, the driver is provided
the standard thirty minute break time plus walking time. Depending on how late
he/she arrived, and how much slack the duty had, the driver may or may not be able
to pick up their next train. In the case of a spell with more than one run, the driver
is assumed to be ready to drive the next train immediately after getting off the previ-
ous train, and therefore this type of pickup is missed only when trains run out of order.
Drivers are relieved early only when they are scheduled to finish their duties at AGR-
WB or ACT-EB, and they have significnant lateness at AGR-EB or ACT-WB. If
their lateness is more than the End of Duty (EoD) slack, then they are relieved early
and a spare driver is used for the remainder of the trip. As described in Section 3.2.5,
the EoD slack is defined as the minimum of: (i) buffer time between end of the last
run and end of the duty, and (ii) time before hitting a parameter (either duty length
or driving time). When a driver is at AGR-EB (or ACT-WB) and knows that it is
not possible to get back to AGR-WB (ACT-EB) on time, the driver often asks to be
relieved. This is the reason that AGR-EB and ACT-WB reliefs are preferred.
A driver is said to have worked overtime, if the driver's lateness when finishing a
duty is more than the EoD slack, and the difference between the two is the amount
of overtime worked. This quantity is summed over all the drivers and averaged over
the simulation runs to calculate the average number of operator-hours of overtime.
Though this is not the main objective of this research, the simulation-based frame-
work can also be used as a tool to evaluate the efficacy of service control policies.
This service control policy makes a trade-off between short-tripping trains (which
hurts customers) and reducing operating costs (by reducing spare driver deployment,
overtime etc.) The simulation can be used to test multiple service control policies
and understand the tradeoffs between operational costs and customer impacts.
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Scenario 2: Disruption on the Rayner's Lane branch
In this scenario, a fifteen minute incident occurring at lOAM midway between Acton
Town and Rayners Lane is simulated with schedules 48 and 49. The simulation is
repeated 100 times and the results are averaged as before.
Figure 5-5 shows the average train arrival lateness under the two schedules at Rayn-
ers Lane Westbound and at Heathrow Terminal 5. It is interesting to see that even
though the disruption occurred on the Rayners Lane branch at lOAM, the effect
was also felt at Heathrow Terminal 5. But this happened nearly three hours later,
which reflects the amount of time taken for a train to travel from Rayners Lane to
Cockfosters and then to Heathrow. Both schedules 48 and 49 perform in line with
expectations.
The two scenarios show the simulated performance of the two crew schedules under
disrupted conditions. The outputs of the simulation are consistent with our expecta-
tions of the line's performance. While this does not represent a statistically rigorous
validation exercise, it serves to ensure that the simulation is performing as intended.
In the case of the Piccadilly Line, service controllers maintain a manual log of the
specific interventions (renumbering, short-turns, cancellations) that they carried out,
and this makes it very difficult to collect a large sample of incidents and associated in-
terventions with which to validate the simulation model. The service manager creates
a daily report which notes the number of trip cancellations, but does not talk about
train renumbering and short-turns. Therefore, it is difficult to perform a large scale
validation exercise to explicitly check if the simulation outputs (especially service
control interventions) are consistent with what happens in practice. Furthermore,
the assumptions in the model that there is an unlimited supply of spare drivers and
that trains are never cancelled are simplifications of reality. Notwithstanding these
shortcomings, the simulation model still provides a reasonable way of understanding
the impacts of the crew schedule's structure on the line's performance.
5.2 Comparative evaluation of Piccadilly Line sched-
ules 48 and 49
Having validated the simulation model, it is now used to evaluate and compare the
performance of Piccadilly Line crew schedules 48 and 49 under disrupted conditions.
As explained in Section 4.2, the schedules must be simulated under a representa-
tive set of incidents in order to evaluate robustness. It is pointless to simulate the
schedules in the absence of incidents, or even under very minor incidents, as these
situations will not stress the schedules and bring out the differences between them.
At the same time, we do not simulate the schedules under extreme incidents because
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making a schedule resilient to extreme incidents would require large slack resources
(slack time and spare operators) making it inefficient. Furthermore, the service con-
trol logic that is implemented in this simulation is not applicable to extreme incidents.
Based on these considerations, incidents in the range of 15-35 minutes are simulated
as explained below.
5.2.1 Distribution of incidents
Freemark[5] characterizes the distribution of incidents on the Piccadilly Line, and
these results are used to construct the distribution of incidents against which the
crew schedules are tested. The distribution of incidents is characterized by their fre-
quency, duration, time of occurrence and location. A panel of 29 disrupted days is
used to characterize the distribution of incidents on the Piccadilly Line.
Freemark notes that there are usually multiple incidents in a day, most often between
two and four. Based on this, we simulate three incidents for each day, one each in
the AM peak, midday and PM peak. This is not a restrictive assumption as the
duration of the incidents are allowed to vary for each of the three periods of the day.
Incidents are not simulated early in the morning and late in the evening because the
service control actions for these incidents can be very different. For instance, service
controllers might respond to an incident late in the night by stabling trains early
rather than trying to reduce lateness.
Freemark observes that there are distinct differences in the durations of incidents
throughout the day. Incidents that take place at the peaks are usually shorter than
those that take place at other times, which might reflect the fact that greater impor-
tance is accorded to ensuring smooth operations during the peak hours. Based on
this data, Table 5.2 specifies the distribution of the duration of incidents (in minutes)
for different times of day that is used in the simulation. The duration of the incident
is assumed to be uniformly distributed between the minimum and maximum values
specified in the table. The time of occurrence of the incident is also assumed to be
uniformly distributed within each interval.
Period Definition Average Minimum Maximum
AM Peak 7:00 - 10:00 20 15 25
Midday 10:00 - 16:00 30 25 35
PM Peak 16:00 - 19:00 17.5 15 20
Table 5.2: Distribution of incident duration by period (in minutes)
Freemark also characterizes the distribution of incident locations. A correction is
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made to account for the differences in network structure. In Freemark's characteriza-
tion, the trunk ends with King's Cross whereas in this simulation it extends to Arnos
Grove. Based on the data, Table 5.3 shows the spatial distribution of incidents. It
is observed that approximately 40% of the incidents take place at the stations in
the network, and the remaining 60% in between the stations in the network. These
incidents could also be happening at stations, but they are not explicitly modeled as
such because of the simplified network structure used here.
Segment Disruption Mins. Adjusted Disruption Mins. Prob. of Incident
UXB-RLN 272 272 9%
RLN-ACT 203 203 7%
Heathrow-ACT 231 231 8%
ACT-AGR 641 741 25%
AGR-CFS 709 346 12%
At ACT 234 333 11%
At AGR 114 263 9%
At CFS 333 114 4%
At UXB 263 234 8%
At RLN 203 203 7%
Table 5.3: Spatial distribution of incidents on the Piccadilly Line
Based on the distributions specified above, three incidents are generated for each
simulation run (which represents one day of operation), one incident for each of
the three periods in the day. The location, time of occurrence and duration of the
three incidents are assumed to be independent. The incident distribution used in this
experiment is designed to generate representative incidents that simulate a reasonable
range of disrupted operating conditions. Evaluating the performance of the crew
schedule under such operating conditions allows us to draw insights into what makes
a crew schedule robust.
5.2.2 Simulation results
The simulation experiment described in the previous subsection was repeated 500
times, and the results averaged to produce daily performance measures. Crew sched-
ules 48 and 49 are both tested on exactly the same set of incidents. Table 5.4 shows
the performance of the two schedules on a number of metrics.
Given the exact same set of incidents, schedule 49 required slightly fewer short-turns
than schedule 48, though this difference is not large enough to be significant. More
significantly, schedule 49 had far fewer missed pickups than schedule 48, which might
be attributed to the improved matching of slack time to typical train lateness in sched-
ule 49. It should be noted that 17 missed pickups is not equivalent to 17 spare drivers
122
Schedule 48 49
Number of short-turns 7.5 6.0
Number of pickups missed 17.2 10.3
Number of drivers relieved early 18.5 7.7
Overtime operator-hours 1.3 3.0
Table 5.4: Performance measures for schedules 48 and 49
being needed. Firstly, a spare driver can perform more than one run. Secondly, when
a driver misses a pickup, the driver is often "converted" to a spare, especially if the
driver has no other runs for the day.
Schedule 49 also has far fewer drivers who need early reliefs at AGR-EB and ACT-
WB, and this can be directly attributed to the improved mix of relief directions in
schedule 49. Schedule 49 also has slightly higher EoD slack time which would have
also helped to improve this metric. Once again, it must be noted that the one driver
being relieved early does not equate to one spare driver.
However, there is a small but significant increase in the overtime hours accumulated
by drivers in schedule 49, because of the reduction in early reliefs for drivers. Overtime
has negative impacts on operational costs and on crew morale, so this is a trade-off
that must be recognized and analysed. But the magnitude of overtime hours here is
very small compared to the scheduled number of driver hours, and therefore is not
a major cause for concern. It should be noted that different agencies have different
ways of dealing with overtime. In some agencies, drivers are monetarily compensated
for having to work beyond their scheduled times. In other cases, drivers are com-
pensated informally in non-monetary ways, such as giving them easier duties or by
relieving them early on another day. For this reason, the impact of overtime varies
from agency to agency.
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 show the relationship between meal break slack and train late-
ness at Acton Town. The blue points represent meal reliefs and the Y-value of the
point is the meal break slack associated with that relief. The orange line shows the
95th percentile of train lateness (from the simulation output) for each fifteen minute
interval between 7AM and 10PM. Note that this does not represent typical train
lateness, which would be calculated for the full range of operating conditions (from
undisrupted to severely disrupted conditions). Rather this represents the 95th per-
centile of lateness under the disrupted conditions that have been simulated in this
experiment, which will be significantly higher than the typical lateness. It is observed
that Schedule 49 has, in general, slightly lower lateness than Schedule 48, and fewer
duties whose slack is less than the 95th percentile of lateness.
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Figure 5-8 shows that the spatial distribution of missed pickups is significantly differ-
ent for the two schedules. Because the mix of relief directions is so different in the two
schedules, this is to be expected. Figure 5-9 shows the temporal distribution of missed
pickups. Most of the missed pickups occur in the periods just after the morning and
evening peaks, which is when most pickups are scheduled. It is also interesting to
note that there are more missed pickups in the evening than the morning. This is
because there is typically more lateness in the evening than in the morning, because
incidents in the mid-day have an effect through the evening. This reasoning is also
borne out by the lateness profiles observed in figures 5-6 and 5-7.
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Figure 5-8: Spatial distribution of Missed pickups
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Figure 5-9: Temporal distribution of Missed pickups
As explained previously, missed pickups can take place after a meal break or during
intermediate reliefs (i.e. during a spell with multiple runs). Considering only the for-
mer, Table 5.5 characterizes the meal break slack associated with the missed pickups.
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, the average meal break slack across all the duties in
schedule 48 is 20 minutes, versus 18 minutes in schedule 49. The average meal break
slack associated with a driver who missed a pickup (after a meal break) in both cases
is 14 minutes. It is logical that the drivers who miss their pickups are those with
smaller than average meal break slack times. For each driver, we calculate the num-
ber of simulation runs (i.e. frequency) in which that driver missed his/her pickup,
and then arrange the drivers in descending order of frequency of missed pickups. The
average slack across the duties that comprise the top 50% of missed pickups is 11
minutes for both schedules. As expected, this is lower than the average slack across
all missed reliefs.
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Average meal break slack across: Schedule 48 Schedule 49
All duties in schedule 20 minutes 18 minutes
Duties that had missed pickups 14 minutes 13 minutes
Duties that make up the top 50% of missed pickups 11 minutes 11 minutes
Table 5.5: Meal break slack across missed pickups
It is easy to say that robustness could be improved by tightening the distribution of
slack time. While it is not possible to increase the average amount of slack in a crew
schedule, given a certain vehicle schedule, without increasing manpower, it is possi-
ble to tighten the distribution of slack, by taking away slack from duties that have
more slack than needed, and redistributing it to duties that can use more of it. But
the degrees of freedom needed to do this have to come from relaxing other constraints.
Average EoD slack across: Schedule 48 Schedule 49
All duties in schedule 7 minutes 8 minutes
Duties that had early reliefs 4 minutes 5 minutes
Duties that make up the top 50% of early reliefs 3 minutes 3 minutes
Table 5.6: EoD slack across early reliefs
Similarly, Table 5.6 characterizes the EoD (end of duty) slack associated with early
reliefs. We observe the same kind of trend as in meal break slack. It must be noted
that improving the distribution of EoD slack does not have as large an effect on ro-
bustness as improving the distribution of meal break slack. This is because a driver
who is finishing his/her duty does not have any more pickups for the day. Having
more EoD slack can reduce the number of early reliefs; but this has already been
significantly reduced by the improvement in relief directions. Having more EoD slack
also reduces the amount of overtime incurred, but this is not very large to begin with.
But to increase the EoD slack, it is necessary to relax some constraints, or increase
manpower, or decrease the amount of meal break slack. This ultimately becomes a
trade-off between the meal break slack and the EoD slack, which is a trade-off be-
tween more robustness and lower overtime costs. The right balance between the two
depends on the priorities of the agency and the simulation can be used as a tool to
evaluate this trade-off.
5.2.3 Simulating hypothetical scenarios
It was observed from Table 5.5 that the duties that had missed pickups most often
also had, on average, significantly lower meal break slack. This suggests that increas-
ing the minimum amount of meal break slack, especially at those times of the day
when trains tend to run late, would reduce missed pickups and increase robustness.
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To check the validity of this hypothesis, we would ideally create a new crew schedule
that enforced a higher minimum slack, of say, 15 minutes, by relaxing some other
constraints or by increasing manpower, and then simulate its performance under dis-
rupted conditions, as was done previously.
Scenario 1: Relaxing the meal break length constraint
In this scenario, we attempt to check this hypothesis by relaxing the constraint on the
duration of the meal break. The meal break is normally fixed at thirty minutes. By
relaxing this constraint, we can ensure that duties that have less than fifteen minutes
of slack time get at least fifteen minutes of slack time. Duties that already have at
least fifteen minutes of slack time do not suffer a reduced meal break. Ideally, the
minimum slack time would vary with time-of-day and relief location depending on the
the typical train lateness that is observed at that relief location at that time-of-day.
However, for the purpose of this scenario we assume that the minimum slack is fixed
at fifteen minutes for all reliefs regardless of when or where they take place.
It is necessary to note that this is merely a workaround that allows us to increase the
minimum slack time without creating a new crew schedule. Ordinarily, the length of
the meal break would not be the constraint that is relaxed. But doing so allows us to
quickly evaluate the impact of having a tighter distribution of slack time. The correct
way of testing the impacts of a tighter slack distribution would be to create a crew
schedule that relaxes some other constraints (such as fixed-link) and then simulate
that schedule. In this scenario, we simulate the performance of schedule 49 under the
same distribution of incidents as before, while relaxing the length of the meal break
to ensure that every duty has at least fifteen minutes of slack time.
Scenario Normal Relaxed Meal Length
Number of short-turns 6.0 6.1
Number of pickups missed 10.3 6.1
Number of drivers relieved early 7.7 7.5
Overtime operator-hours 3.0 2.8
Table 5.7: Performance measures for schedule 49 with meal break length constraint relaxed
Table 5.7 shows the result of the simulation. As expected the number of missed
pickups declines. The number of short-turns does not change because controller in-
tervention depends on train lateness and not driver lateness. The number of early
reliefs and overtime hours also decline very slightly, though this might just be noise
in the model, and not because of the increased slack.
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Scenario 2: Reduced walking time at Arnos Grove
Ever since the completion of the foot bridge at Arnos Grove, there has been talk
of reducing the walking time at Arnos Grove from the current 7/8 minutes to 3/4
minutes. This has not yet been implemented in the crew schedules because of failure
to reach agreement with the labour unions. In this scenario, we simulate the effect
of reducing the walking time at Arnos Grove to a flat 4 minutes. This has the effect
of increasing the slack time for all Arnos Grove duties by 6-8 minutes which should
improve robustness. We should note that if the walking time at Arnos Grove was
really reduced, the corresponding crew schedule would end up splitting the benefits
of increased slack between Arnos Grove and Acton Town. However, for the purposes
of this scenario, it is assumed that only the Arnos Grove duties benefit from increased
slack time. The scenario is simulated under the same distribution of incidents as be-
fore.
Scenario Normal Reduced AGR Walking Time
Number of short-turns 6.0 5.7
Number of pickups missed 10.3 5.5
Number of drivers relieved early 7.7 7.4
Overtime operator-hours 3.0 2.6
Table 5.8: Performance measures for schedule 49 with reduced walking time at Arnos
Grove
Table 5.8 shows the result of the simulation. As expected, the performance of the
schedule improves, and in fact, the performance in scenario 2 is even better than in
scenario 1. This is to be expected given that in scenario 2 all AGR duties get an
additional 6-8 minutes of slack time, whereas in scenario 1, only those duties with
less than 15 minutes of slack time, get additional slack.
From both of these hypothetical scenarios, we can conclude that improving the dis-
tribution of slack time by raising the minimum amount of slack, even while keeping
the average slack constant can improve the robustness of a schedule. To do so, it is
necessary to relax certain constraints, and the simulation can be used to understand
the trade-off involved.
These scenarios provide an example of how the simulation model can be used as a
tool to inform labour negotiations by providing management with an understanding
of the impact of proposed changes. Whenever changes are made to labour agreements
or other crew-related matters, it is often assumed that the only impact will be lower
or higher manpower costs.- But it is often the case that such changes will also impact
the performance of the line. For instance, the fixed-link agreement at Arnos Grove
resulted in a sub-optimal mix of crew relief directions, and a loss of flexibility to
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adjust the distribution of slack time. These unintended consequences had a negative
effect on performance because the new crew schedule was found to be less flexible dur-
ing disruptions. Had management known this before the negotiation process started,
they might have negotiated differently. Labour agreements are reviewed periodically,
and it is in the management's interest to know beforehand how any proposed changes
might impact the line's performance.
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, the simulation tool was validated by running it under a variety of
operating conditions and looking at many different indicators to ensure that the out-
put of the simulation is consistent with what is observed in practice. Train lateness,
running times and headway data from a simulation of undisrupted conditions were
compared with observed data from undisrupted days, and the two were found to be
consistent. The effect of service control was demonstrated by simulating a disruption
in the trunk of the line, with and without service control interventions. In the latter
case, train lateness persisted for much longer than when service controllers intervened
to put trains and drivers back on time. The simulation was also used to highlight
the differing impacts of incidents occur on the branches as compared to incidents on
the trunk portion of the line. All of these exercises serve to verify and validate the
simulation model of the Piccadilly Line.
The simulation tool was then used to evaluate and compare the performance of Pic-
cadilly Line crew schedules 48 and 49 under a reasonable distribution of incidents.
Three incidents were generated per simulation run (i.e. per day), one each in the AM
peak, midday and PM peak periods. Based on prior research that characterized the
occurrence of incidents on the Piccadilly Line, distributions for the location, duration
and time of the incident were obtained. The distributions of simulated incidents are
designed to represent a reasonable level of stress on the crew schedules that allows us
to compare the robustness of the two crew schedules.
The comparison shows that Schedule 49 outperformed Schedule 48 on a number of
key indicators such as number of missed pickups, number of early reliefs and number
of short-turns. Some of these results, such as the decrease in the number of early re-
liefs can be predicted based on the structural comparison of the two schedules which
showed that schedule 49 had a vastly improved mix of relief directions compared to
schedule 48. However, schedule 49 also had slightly lower average slack, more duties
that were close to the driving time parameter, and better matching between lateness
and slack. The first two changes would likely hurt robustness, while the last change
would help robustness - but overall it is unclear, based on just the structural evalua-
tion, whether schedule 49 would perform better or worse than schedule 48. However,
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the simulation shows that schedule 49 has fewer missed reliefs and short turns, and is
therefore more robust than schedule 48. Herein, lies the true power of the simulation
in that it allows us to evaluate the impact of changes where the effect on robustness
is unclear.
Upon closer inspection of the simulation results, we find that the average slack time
across the missed pickups is significantly lower than the average slack time in the
crew schedule. This suggests the hypothesis that increasing the minimum slack time
improves robustness. Given a certain vehicle schedule and manpower level, the aver-
age slack time cannot be changed. However, it is possible to change the allocation of
slack time between duties, though doing so requires degrees of freedom that can only
be obtained by relaxing other constraints. We relax the constraint on the length of
the meal break to ensure that every duty has at least fifteen minutes of slack time.
Ideally, this minimum slack would vary by time-of-day and relief location, and it
would be enforced while creating the crew schedule and not during the simulation by
relaxing a constraint. Nevertheless, it provides an approximate way of confirming the
hypothesis that improving the minimum slack time improves robustness.
A second hypothetical scenario is tested in which the walking time at Arnos Grove
is reduced by 3-4 minutes. This is an issue that has been in negotiation for several
years, and the simulation allows us to understand the impacts of the reduction on
schedule performance. As expected, the performance of the schedule improves, and
this demonstrates how the simulation model can be used to inform labour negotia-
tions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The first part of this chapter summarizes the thesis and the key findings from the
research. It also presents the main recommendations that are made to the Piccadilly
Line as a result of this analysis. Finally the limitations of this work and the scope
for more research that arises from this thesis are discussed.
6.1 Summary
This thesis has taken a broad approach to the topic of robust crew scheduling on
a high-frequency rail transit line. Since the focus of the research and applications
were focused on the London Underground Piccadilly line, several of the findings are
specific to that line. However, the overall approach - the simulation-based framework
for evaluating the robustness of a schedule, the development of a simulation model
for a high-frequency rail transit service, the measures for evaluating the structure
and robustness of a schedule, the interaction between service control and the crew
schedule - is not specific to the Piccadilly Line. Therefore, many of the conclusions
are also applicable to other metro lines and systems. Though they would have to
be adapted to the characteristics of that line and to the available data, the overall
approach could largely follow the one described here. Moreover, as other transit agen-
cies may have better train location and crew data available, not all the limitations
encountered in the analysis of crew management on the London Underground may
apply to the analysis of lines on other metro systems.
The second chapter of this thesis introduced the context in which to understand
robustness, by discussing the types of incidents that take place on a line, the ser-
vice control process that is necessary to deal with incidents, and how service control
policies are affected by crew constraints and the crew schedule. We showed that an
understanding of the robustness of a crew schedule can only be obtained in the con-
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text of the service control policies that make use of those robustness elements. The
main drivers of service control are often considerations about crew management, the
level of service to passengers, rolling stock management, safety and infrastructure
maintenance.
Aside from these considerations, virtually all decisions are influenced by uncertainties
regarding the outcome of an intervention and concerns about the manageability of
the service. It was seen that the reliability of the system depends on many factors
which are endogenous to it and which may previously not have been recognized. In
the absence of official policies or effective decision support, the management of these
factors is often governed by rules of thumb. As a result service control not only works
to manage unreliability caused by exogenous events but can also be the cause of un-
reliability as controllers work to meet other objectives and constraints.
A review of the literature in this field showed that while the robustness of schedules
has been evaluated before, the focus has mostly been on vehicle schedules (or timeta-
bles) and not crew schedules. Furthermore, most of the literature does not capture
the close relationship between service control and crew schedule robustness, which is
particularly critical for high-frequency systems. While there has been some research
in the airline industry that considers this aspect, there is a lack of such research in
rail and transit systems.
Therefore, any effort to improve service control (and thus, operations in general) on
a specific metro line must build on a solid understanding of how that line operates.
While this may previously have been a task which was achieved mainly with the help
of models, the roles of modeling and data analysis in transit operations are shifting
in light of the increased availability and accessibility of automatically collected oper-
ations and passenger travel data. This thesis makes use of the availability of vehicle
tracking data to build a simulation model that can evaluate the performance of crew
schedules.
While crew schedules have traditionally been designed in such a way that the vehicle
schedule can be operated at minimum cost, there has been a growing awareness within
the London Underground of the potential for improving (or hurting) performance by
tweaking the crew schedule. Feedback from the service controllers on what works
in the crew schedule, what does not, and what changes would be helpful, reaches
the crew scheduling team through the line management, and schedulers attempt to
incorporate this feedback, given the labour constraints that need to be met and the
available manpower.
This leads to different crew schedules with similar underlying timetables having vary
different structures as is the case with Piccadilly Line crew schedules 48 and 49. In
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Chapter 3, these differences were highlighted by comparing the two crew schedules
along a number of different metrics. For instance, schedule 49 has a better mix of
relief directions than schedule 48, and a time-varying distribution of slack that is
more aligned with typical train lateness. However, schedule 49 also has slightly lower
slack time on average and more duties that approach the driving time limit.
These metrics, such as relief mix and slack time, were chosen because they are under-
stood to have direct impacts on how the schedule performs during disruptions. While
the impact of some of these metrics (such as relief directions) on the line's perfor-
mance is clear, the same might not be true of other metrics. Also, a schedule might
improve on some metrics and be worse with respect to other metrics. Therefore, a
structural evaluation alone is not always sufficient to tell us how all of the different
aspects of the schedule come together to influence performance.
Furthermore, it is not always clear how to use additional degrees of freedom that are
obtained by relaxing other constraints (perhaps as a result of labour negotiations or
changes in physical infrastructure) or by more manpower. The additional freedom
could be used in a number of ways to improve the schedule's performance, and a
structural evaluation alone does not tell us the best way to deploy these resources.
These shortcomings in the structural evaluation of crew schedule performance moti-
vate the creation of a simulation-based framework for evaluating a crew schedule's
performance, which is the subject of Chapter 4.
Simulation is a powerful tool as it allows us to capture the interactions between mul-
tiple objects such as trains, drivers, incidents, service controllers etc. This allows the
system to be represented at a level of detail that is impossible with analytic mod-
els. Furthermore, simulation is ideally suited to make use of the large amounts of
disaggregate data available from train tracking systems, fare collection systems etc.
The model simulates the operations of a high-frequency rail transit line for a range
of incidents and this allows the evaluation of the robustness of crew schedules.
In Chapter 4 a general simulation architecture is described that can be applied to
any high-frequency transit service, and a model is developed for the Piccadilly Line,
which is the key contribution of this research. The simulator is event based and the
events correspond to the arrival and departure of trains from stations. The model
simplifies the line's network by focusing only on reversing locations and crew change
locations, and aggregating all the other stations into segments. This allows for sim-
pler running time and dwell time models. The model ensures that train movements
on the simplified network are representative of the actual network by accounting for
train blocking, platform capacity constraints, correlation between running times, and
temporal variation of running times and dwell times.
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Based on the general motivations behind service control and the author's close obser-
vation of the Piccadilly Line control center, service control policies for minor disrup-
tions on the Piccadilly Line are implemented, which are primarily train renumbering
and short turning. These service control policies do not cover the entire gamut of
possible controller interventions, but are meant to be representative of service con-
trol practice on the Piccadilly Line during minor incidents. The inclusion of service
control in the simulation model allows for minor incidents to be simulated. It enables
us to see how different schedules perform given the same kind of incidents, and this
is the subject of Chapter 5.
In this chapter, the simulation tool is first validated by running it under a variety of
operating conditions and looking at different indicators (such as train lateness, run-
ning times and headway data) to ensure that the output of the simulation is consistent
with what is observed in practice. The effect of service control was demonstrated by
simulating a disruption in the trunk section of the line, with and without service
control interventions. In the latter case, train lateness persisted for much longer than
when service controllers intervened to put trains and drivers back on time. The sim-
ulation was also used to highlight the differing impacts of incidents that occur on
the branches as compared to incidents on the trunk portion of the line. All of these
exercises served to verify and validate the simulation model of the Piccadilly Line.
The simulation model is then used to evaluate and compare the performance of Pic-
cadilly Line crew schedules 48 and 49 under a reasonable distribution of incidents.
Based on prior research that characterized the occurrence of incidents on the Pic-
cadilly Line, distributions for the location, duration and time of the incident were
obtained. The distributions of incidents that are simulated are designed to represent
a reasonable level of stress on the crew schedules that allows us the comparison of
robustness of the two crew schedules.
The comparison shows that Schedule 49 outperformed Schedule 48 on a number of key
indicators such as the number of missed pickups, number of early reliefs and number
of short-turns. These results could not have been predicted by merely comparing the
structures of the two crew schedules, and therein lies the power of the simulation-
based approach.
Upon closer inspection of the simulation results, we find that the average slack time
across the missed pickups is significantly lower than the average slack time in the
crew schedule. This suggests the hypothesis that increasing the minimum slack time
improves robustness. We test a hypothetical scenario by relaxing the constraint on
the length of the meal break to ensure that every duty has at least fifteen minutes of
slack time. Ideally, this minimum slack would vary by time-of-day and relief location,
and it would be enforced while creating the crew schedule and not just during the
simulation by relaxing a constraint. A second hypothetical scenario is tested where
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the walking time at Arnos Grove is reduced by 3-4 minutes. This is an issue that has
been in negotiation for several years, and the simulation allows us to understand the
impacts of the reduction on schedule performance. As expected, the performance of
the schedule in both cases improves, and this demonstrates how the simulation model
can be used to inform labour negotiations.
6.2 Recommendations
At the outset, the complexity of the problem must be recognized. Multiple teams
such as planning, scheduling, service control and crew management come together
to make the line's operations possible. Understanding this context, the following
recommendations are made to the Piccadilly Line and the London Underground based
on this research. The recommendations are divided into three topics: crew scheduling,
service control and data collection.
6.2.1 Crew scheduling
" The importance of having the right mix of relief directions has been recognized
both in practice by controllers over many years, and through the simulation.
While it is desirable to have the majority of crew reliefs in the preferred direc-
tions, it is necessary to have reliefs of different types for operational flexibility.
The simulation can be used as a tool to test and find the right mix of reliefs.
" The Piccadilly Line crew schedules have large amounts of slack time in the
form of many duties with more slack time than can be reasonably used, and
other duties that could use more slack time. However, to reallocate the slack
time between duties it is necessary to provide the schedulers more freedom by
relaxing other constraints which can only happen through labour negotiations.
Some of the constraints that could be considered are: the fixed-link constraint
at Arnos Grove, which is particularly onerous and might well be removed with
the proposed splitting of the Arnos Grove crew base; the cap on the number
of drivers who are allowed to book on/off remotely at the depots, resulting in
other drivers needing to book on at the crew base and waste time travelling to
the depot. The Piccadilly Line management might be interested in seeing if any
of these labour agreements are worth re-negotiating by creating a crew schedule
for a hypothetical scenario where the agreement is relaxed (or changed in some
way) and using the simulation model to understand the impacts of that change.
" In reallocating slack time, it is also important to tie slack time to lateness. The
average (and minimum) slack times for reliefs at a certain location and certain
time of the day should depend on the typical train lateness observed at that
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location at that time of day. The typical lateness can be calculated using Net-
MIS data and using appropriate percentiles. For instance, management may
wish to tie the minimum slack to the 90th percentile of lateness and the average
slack to the 95th percentile of lateness. Such analysis assumes the availability
of large quantities of reliable train tracking data which is not the case at present.
9 When re-negotiating labour agreements it is advisable to understand the im-
pacts that the negotiations will have on the crew schedule structure, and con-
sequently on the schedule's performance. The simulation model can aid in that
process. Such negotiations may be likely in the future because of the new crew
base that has opened at Northfields, and another that may be opening shortly
at Cockfosters/Oakwood. Though these changes would necessitate an update
to the service control policies implemented in the model, the effort might be
worth it to predict in advance, the impacts of these changes.
6.2.2 Service control
Section 2.4 showed the strong links between train service control and crew manage-
ment, and described strategies which have been developed by the controllers on the
Piccadilly Line to tie crew management constraints into their decision-making pro-
cess. The problems surrounding crew management are deeply related to information
availability and management. In addition to the continuous stream of real-time in-
formation on the train service which controllers compare to (mostly static) timetable
information to make service control decisions, they need crew data to make effective
control decisions. Some of this information is present in the crew schedules, but it
is difficult to find in a high-stress situation. Controllers on the Piccadilly Line are
currently not provided with any live crew data (such as their driving time, slack time
etc.). At the same time the provision of information on crew movements and crew
schedules in a raw format adds another level of complexity for the controllers which
can be very difficult 'to handle. Moreover, controllers do not have direct authority
over drivers, which are primarily the responsibility of the DMT (Duty Manager -
Trains). Yet, since every change to a train trajectory is also a change to a driver's
schedule, the situation in which controllers have insufficient information about and a
lack of authority over crews places an unnecessary constraint on their flexibility when
managing the service.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that management of train service is central-
ized whereas crew management is decentralized and there is no central tracking of
drivers, driver lateness and spare driver availability. The information about these
variables is spread over the crew depots, without a continuous feed of information
into the control center. It was observed that even at the level of the individual crew
depots, DMTs often only track their drivers and driver lateness in the immediate
vicinity of their crew depot. Drivers are often the only ones who know whether they
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are late with respect to the crew schedule and whether they are at risk of violating
driving time or duty length constraints. If controllers need to get a reliable picture
of driver lateness and driver availability for unscheduled train movements, they gen-
erally have to request the information by telephone from the DMTs or by radio from
the drivers. These communications are time consuming. Since many interventions
need to be made under significant time pressure, this is a limiting factor which may
cause a controller to choose a solution which is robust in terms of crew management
or which minimizes the need for communication.
Many of the current service control policies are designed to deal with these shortcom-
ings in the controller's environment, and given better information, it might well be
possible to make better control decisions. For instance, the controller's decision on
whether to put a late train back on time is triggered by the train's lateness which is
assumed to be equal to the driver's lateness, when in fact the primary motivation for
putting a train back on time comes from crew management concerns. It would be
very useful to provide controllers information on the driver who is aboard each train,
and what the driver's parameters are like. Even better than just providing informa-
tion would be the provision of real-time decision support systems that process the
information and provide controllers with useful outputs, such as the predicted impact
of certain control actions. A system which anticipates conflicts and alerts controllers
ahead of time can help them make decisions at an earlier stage, allowing more time
for mitigating the impact of service control interventions.
6.2.3 Data collection
e The Piccadilly Line currently has very poor electronic crew management data,
and it could gain significant value from more reliable crew data. Having better
crew data can improve service control decisions, and can also help with better
planning, analysis and scheduling. This could be achieved either by enforcing
operator logins more strictly and establishing clear rules on how spare drivers
log in or by the deployment of a personal chip card which drivers must insert
into a reader in order to enable train controls.
e As preliminary work towards improving the modeling of line behavior after
disruptions with TSM, which could ultimately be extended to include a rudi-
mentary set of service control interventions, service controller logs should be
digitized. It would be very helpful to understand what service controllers per-
ceived as the incident, and what their interventions were. Currently, the Pic-
cadilly Line service controllers maintain manual logs of the actions that they
took while reforming the service. Having this information in a standardized dig-
ital format would allow for it to be used in computerized models, such as this
simulation model and TSM. The primary reason for not explicitly validating
the service control policies implemented in this model is the lack of this data.
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Having this data would also allow the management or an analyst to look back
in time to see how incidents were handled, and come up with best practices for
service control.
9 The quality of train tracking (NetMIS) data on the Piccadilly Line is poor.
Very often the train number and/or trip number is incorrectly identified. This
hampers service control, though the MEL system has been a workaround for
this. The poor quality of NetMIS data also hampers planning and analysis,
such as this simulation. Given better quality NetMIS data, it would be possible
to generate more accurate train lateness distributions which can improve slack
time allocation, and also make simulation models (such as this model and TSM)
more accurate.
6.3 Limitations of this work
As with any model, simplifications of the real world system are made in the interests
of model tractability, which impose limitations on the model's use, and there is always
scope for improvement. The following are some of the simplifications that this model
makes that present opportunities for improvement:
" Service control: This model has embedded fairly simple service control poli-
cies. While these policies are fairly representative of controller interventions
in response to minor incidents, they are certainly not comprehensive. For in-
stance, this simulation does not cancel trains and stable them, which is a fairly
common practice. Control strategies also vary by time-of-day with different
strategies being used early in the morning and late at night. Also, there is a
certain amount of stochasticity in control interventions because of variations in
the thought process and styles of different controllers and because there are few
fixed rules in place for service control. And finally, the Piccadilly Line plans to
split the crew bases at Acton Town and Arnos Grove, and a new crew base at
Northfields has already been opened. This will definitely impact control strate-
gies as there are now more relief locations, and crew management is a major
factor affecting control actions. For all these reasons, it is possible to make
significant improvements to the service control module of this simulation.
" Train movements: This model uses a simplified route network that focuses on
train movements at crew change and reversing locations. This was a deliberate
design choice because the focus of the model is ultimately on the crew, and the
objective was to develop a train movement model that was capable of modeling
train lateness at crew change locations. Clearly, the train movement model can
be improved by increasing the level of detail, by more carefully modeling the
interaction between successive trains, by having more detailed station movement
models, or by interfacing with micro-simulation models such as TSM.
" Effect of incidents: In this model, an incident is modeled as an event that
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increases the running time of the affected train by a certain amount, which
is the duration of the incident. In reality, the affected train experiences a
further increase in running time because of higher than average dwell times
at downstream stations due to the large gap in service preceding the affected
train. This phenomenon is not explicitly modeled in this simulation. Instead, it
is assumed that the duration of the incident accounts not only for the duration
when the train was stopped, but also for this increase in running time. Modeling
this phenomenon would improve the representation of the effects of the incident
on train movement.
" Spare drivers: In this model, it is assumed that there is effectively an unlim-
ited supply of spare drivers so that a train is never held in a station because
of a missing driver. In reality, this situation, called an ONA (Operator Not
Available) does occur. This is because service controllers do not have a con-
tinuous stream of information on (regular and spare) driver movements, and it
is left to the Duty Managers at the crew depots to ensure that every train has
a driver. Due to miscommunication, lack of information or other reasons, this
does not always happen. Furthermore, when a spare driver is used instead of a
regular driver (for instance, because the regular driver was late returning from
a meal break), the regular driver often joins the pool of spare drivers for the
rest of his/her duty. Service controllers tend not to rely heavily on spare drivers
because of their uncertain availability. A more realistic representation of spare
driver availability and utilization would improve the realism of the model.
" Explicit modeling of incidents: In this model, the running times and dwell
time that are used are derived from undisrupted days, and incidents are super-
imposed by the simulation. This is an explicit way of modeling incidents. An
implicit way of modeling incidents would be to use running times and dwell times
from a large collection of days (say, a year) that includes the full gamut of op-
erating conditions, including undisrupted days and days with varying levels of
disruption. In doing so, the simulation would not explicitly generate incidents.
The effect of the incidents would automatically be accounted for in the running
time (and dwell time) distributions. These distributions would then have longer
tails, and when randomly sampling from them, a larger running time would oc-
casionally be picked, representing an incident. There are two major advantages
to this approach: (i) there is no need to construct distributions of incidents and
then draw from them, and (ii) there is no need to explicitly model the effect of
the incidents on train movements. However, the advantage of explicitly model-
ing incidents is that we have the ability to simulate the effects of specific types
of incidents, which we would be infeasible if incidents were modeled implicitly.
However, implicitly modeling incidents is a very viable alternative approach to
building this kind of model. This alternative was rejected in the case of the
Piccadilly Line because of a lack of reliable train movement data that covers
the full spectrum of operating conditions.
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6.4 Directions for future research
The following are some directions for future research that emerge from this the-
sis:
* Evaluating service control strategies: Service contol plays a pivotal role
in the operations of a transit line, especially during disruptions. When an inci-
dent causes significant deviations from the operations plan, service controllers
need to intervene in order to maintain or restore the feasibility of the opera-
tions plan, and minimize passenger and operational costs. In doing so, there
are always trade-offs to be made. Certain control strategies, say canceling or
short-turning many disrupted trains, might help restore service quickly, but at
great passenger inconvenience. On the other hand, other strategies that aim
to minimize passenger inconvenience due to the incident, might end up incur-
ring large operational costs in the form of driver lateness and overtime costs.
These trade-offs are especially stark during more severe disruptions. And while
it is clear that a balance needs to be struck between the two objectives based
on the management's service and labour policies, it is not clear what the best
control strategy to do so is. The simulation can be used to evaluate the impact
of different service control strategies in response to incidents. The performance
measures in the model can easily be expanded to capture more passenger-centric
metrics so that the trade-off between operational and passenger impacts can be
evaluated.
" Real-time decision support: Service control is a centralized function that
monitors the state of the system in real-time and responds to deviations from the
operations plan. In the case of the Piccadilly Line, controllers have fairly good
knowledge about the state of the trains in the system (i.e. location, destination,
lateness etc.), though they have next to no information about the operators in
those trains. They do not know, for instance, which driver is on a train, how
close the driver is to his/her parameters etc. Some of this information can be
inferred from the crew schedule, but it is difficult to do so under pressure. They
often need to speak to the operator or a depot manager to get that information.
While it may be possible to provide them with that information, it is not clear
if a controller would be able to process it to make better control decisions, espe-
cially during the high-stress situations during disruptions. A real-time decision
support system goes beyond just providing controllers with raw information,
and instead synthesizes that information to provide useful tools in aiding de-
cision making. For instance, it could predict the outcome of certain control
actions, or even suggest control actions. To do so, it would be necessary to
simulate different control scenarios in real-time and evaluate those scenario in
terms of relevant metrics, which is exactly what this simulation model does.
* Improving operations at crew bases: Currently, the duty manager at each
crew base is responsible for the drivers who report to there. Section 6.2.2 de-
scribed the way that authority is shared and information flows between the crew
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bases and the control centre, and the many problems with this structure. It
is the author's belief that it is possible to significantly improve the operations
at the crew bases, and that this might have a greater positive impact on ser-
vice reliability than improvements to the crew schedule. Having an electronic
system in place that monitors the state of all drivers, including where they are
currently, how close they are to their parameters, and providing alerts about
possible infeasibility in their trajectories would go a long way in streamlining
crew operations at the bases. This information could be provided both to the
duty managers at the depots, and to the service controllers and would help both
parties make better decisions, and would reduce the amount of time wasted on
unnecessary communication. Depending on how authority is split between the
control centre and the crew bases, it may be desirable to have a decision support
system for the crew bases that helps duty managers adapt to control interven-
tions (such as short-turns and renumbering) and ensure that they are able to
staff every train as required. Alternatively, this decision support system could
be centralized at the control centre and it could give instructions to the duty
managers that they would then have to implement.
Another important aspect of the operations at crew bases is the deployment of
spare operators. While this was not a focus of this thesis, it is an area that has
not received much attention in the past, and it may hold scope for potentially
improving the service. As things stand, the deployment of spare operators
is left to the duty managers at the depots. Service controllers tend not to
rely on spare drivers if they can because they do not have reliable information
on the availability of spare drivers. It would interesting to study how service
control strategies can be improved if service controllers are aware of the exact
availability of spare drivers at the start of each day. This also automatically
leads to the question of whether the scheduling of spare drivers can be improved.
The simulation model can potentially be used to test both questions.
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